When a teenager hijacked plane with a toy pistol - RAW Operation

What happened on January 30, 1971?

1) What we know is there were two Kashmiris, Hashim Quereshi and his cousin Ashraf Butt, who went on to highjack an Indian Airlines plane named ‘Ganga’ using a Toy Pistol.

2) They take the craft to Lahore, burn it down, Pakistan was happy, they were treated as heroes, Pakistan created a mini-media spectacle thinking it would promote the Kashmiri cause. Passengers were safe, as the intention was to, apparently, promote the “cause” and advertise it to the world.

A picture of the type of aircraft in question. Ganga was an old Fokker F27 Friendship Indian Airlines aircraft.

3) On January 31, Z.A. Bhutto, Pakistani PM to be and the most prominent Politician of the then West Pakistan, visited the airport and embraced the two hijackers as true champions of the Pakistani cause. After five days, he issued a statement to the effect that the hijackers were “two brave men” and their deed demonstrated that “no power on earth can stifle the Kashmiris’ struggle for liberation.” The Pakistani authorities justified the hijacking which they described as the direct result of repressive measures taken by the Government of India in Kashmir.

4) Indian Government seethes with anger and bans overflight from West Pakistan to East Pakistan. A major blow, considering soldiers were being transported in civilian disguise in civilian planes, for the impending bloody massacre of fellow Pakistanis by Pakistani soldiers; and the war that is to follow. The crucial air link is cut off.

5) India liberates “Bangladesh” from Pakistan.

Till now facts speak for themselves. But, strange things begin to happen.

1) Pakistan jails one of the high-jackers for 19 years! Labelling them agents of India and calling one of them BSF. They realised that this Highjacking was used by Indira Gandhi to ban overhead flights between the 2 wings of Pakistan.

2) It comes to be known that the aircraft in question was the oldest of its type in the fleet of the Indian Airlines, was in a poor state of maintenance and lacked certain items of equipment usually carried on such aircraft. Basically the loss of the craft was no-big-deal. It was old and dusty.

3) Now, G.M. Sadiq, the Chief Minister of Jammu & Kashmir, calls this an Indian plan. Basically, a false flag operation by India.

Who benefits, who loses?

To put things simply. Pakistan loses, India gains tremendously.

Pakistani losses: Pakistan wanted to highlight India’s actions in Kashmir. But, ended up getting cut off from its own Eastern wing. By helping the Terrorists, Pakistan forces India’s hand to ban the overhead flights between the 2 wings.

Considering most of the troop movement used to happen using these overhead flights, under civilian disguise, this was a major blow to Pakistani war efforts and a disruption of troop movement.

Indian gains: Needless to say, India had nothing but to gain from these two idiotic youths taking their plane to Lahore. Even the Aircraft, as it turned out, was old and had no real value. No passengers were hurt(even though their lives were at risk). India gets a solid reason to ban the overhead flight privileges, stops the Pakistani troop movement, escalates the cost and time to transport the troops from West wing to the East for Pakistan.

When Pakistan jails the Terrorist accusing them of acting on behalf of India, India manages to ignite few protests against Pakistan by Kashmiris in Pakistan and outside of the Sub-Continent(Owning to pressure of overseas Kashmiris and the disquiet of Kashmiris in PoK, Pakistan had to release the Terrorist, who later gives up arms to pursue a peaceful resolution of Kashmir. I wonder why!).

Into the realm of speculation and conjecture

Now, with our bases covered, lets look at the interview of the high jacker, who now lives in India.

The interview can be found here:

“In a haircutting salon in Lal Chowk, I met a Kashmiri Border Security Force (BSF) officer. I told him I wanted to go to Pakistan. He agreed to help me cross the border provided I brought some information the BSF needed. I agreed and the BSF managed my clandestine entry into Pakistan through the Sialkot border.”

He was actually double-crossing the BSF. In Pakistan, Hashim was trained for the hijack.

“Maqbool Bhat said to highlight the Kashmir problem we must hijack an Indian plane. Javaid Mantoo, a retired pilot, helped familiarise me with a Fokker Friendship plane. He took me to Chaklala airport where I was allowed to see the plane from inside.”

After hijack training, Hashim crossed back into Kashmir from the Sialkot border.

“I boarded a bus, but the bus was stopped by police and I was caught with a pistol and a hand grenade. I was taken to a BSF interrogation centre. I told them how I had been trained along with three others for the hijack in Pakistan.

“I was asked by the BSF to keep a watch at the Srinagar airport. An advertisement appeared in a newspaper about the sale of a look-real pistol which could be used to scare away thieves. I ordered one by post. I fabricated a wooden hand grenade and painted it with metallic colour.”

After the episode, Pakistan alleges that Indian agencies conducted this false flag operation, by R&AW, tags one of the Terrorist as an Indian agent and tortures him and puts in jail. 

Now, tell me if this isn’t better than Argo!

Indira Gandhi, whom the liberated, free citizens of Bangladesh begin to call “Maa Durga”, deserves a lot of credit, for quickly using this as a justification for banning the flights, imposing a major tactical disadvantage on the Pakistanis. Apart from the CM of J&K saying this was an Indian operation, no accounts of this have been released by India and R&AW.

You can guess why – People in the aircraft(Indian citizens) were put at risk, intentionally, by the planners. Admitting this would create a controversy within India, as to why Indian civilians were put in harm’s way. India loses face at the international level, as India had long maintained that it did nothing to precipitate the war and war was forced upon it.

R&AW might not be as glamorous, or might have the technology of a CIA, but if this indeed, seems very likely it was, a R&AW operation, full marks to it. It achieved the desired result, with zero lives lost, no damage to the infrastructure and sowing the seeds of confusion in the opposing ranks. India gets what it wants – Stop movement of troops from West Pakistan to the East, thereby escalating the cost and the time required to transport the troops.

All of this using a Toy Pistol and a wooden “grenade”. And, we think CIA’s hunt of Osama was awesome!

Kashmir : The War of Arms and Hearts

Most wars are uncertain, some leading to victory, some in defeat. But sustained trans-border proxy war and jihad thrusts are more uncertain. It is possible to find our lasting solution to ethnic unrest, which is political in nature, but it is difficult to vanquish the enemy which directs the proxy war sitting in comfort of war rooms. The jihadis and terrorists bred by them taking advantage of certain unsolved legacy of history and religious susceptibilities are also mushrooming enemies, who are mostly invisible and rarely come under the hairpin of the guns of the defending soldiers. There is another war to win besides the military engagement; the war of minds.

So much has been written on Kashmir problem and Pakistan inspired and engineered jihad thrusts and terrorists actions that no new furrow can be cut by following the old grounds. It is better to focus on the players and the end results they expect and portray what the people of Indian Kashmir aspire for. Before we look into the dark areas of jihad campaign and internal failures let us have a look at the physical status of Kashmir, as it was thrown in the tailspin of partition and deceitful occupation by Pakistan.

In India there exist some misperceptions that Abdullah and Nehru’s Kashmir Valley, Jammu and Leh constitute the geopolitical status of Kashmir. Historically speaking the entire Northern Area of J&K ruled by Maharaja Hari Singh was annexed by Pakistan in collaboration with the British officers posted there as administrative and military heads. The area known as Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) or Azad Kashmir was annexed by Pakistan as Sheikh Abdullah and Nehru were not determined to allow the Indian army to chase away the Pakistani aggressors beyond Muzaffarabad. The sordid history of that episode has been bleeding India incessantly since 1948. This is an instance of effeminate foreign policy and inexcusable intervention in the war plan of the Indian army; a greater colossal blunder than emasculation of the armed forces between 1950 and 1962 that encouraged China to humiliate India and encouraged Pakistan to attack India again in 1965. Leadership failure has chained the country almost permanently to the Kashmir quagmire and possible future wars with China and Pakistan.

When India talks of Composite dialogue it probably means a fresh legalized partition of Kashmir along the Line of Control. When Pakistan talks about Comprehensive dialogue it means total vacation of Kashmir by India-ultimate fulfillment of the agenda of partition. When the Indian Kashmiri separatists talk about solution, some insist on merger with Pakistan and some others talk of independence-sans Indian and Pakistani interference; a South Asian Switzerland. Some politicians in India (including the Congress and Sangh Parivar Brigade) talk in term of restoration of the entire Kashmir to India. In the case of Congress this is a mere populist posture; not even a diplomatic approach and strategic formulation. The Sangh Parivar reflects common Indian sentiment but even during the BJP rule it did not make headway diplomatically, least to speak of strategically. The other political forces are busy with bread and butter and pocketfuls of people’s money. Existence of live contradiction in perception in India has contributed to the failure of structuring a broader bilateral and international diplomatic policy. Since military solution is not on the anvil the Indian forces are busy with containing the jihadi thrusts from Pakistan, which has often spilled over the borders of Kashmir and affected various parts of India. India’s failure on diplomatic as well as military fronts has given excessive leeway to the Pakistani Establishment and certain disgruntled elements in Indian Kashmir to intensify the jihad campaign. Let us examine the intricate machinery that Pakistan employ to bleed India.

It is necessary to analyze how Pakistan views and treats the occupied portions of Jammu and Kashmir. The so-called Azad Kashmir is totally under the control of Pakistan and ISI and Islambad’s will determine all the parameters of election to the legislative assembly, appointment of Governor and ministers. Most key officers are exported from Punjab and few key departments are held by serving or retired officers of the armed forces. In all practical considerations Azad Kashmir is an extended part of Pakistani Punjab, acting as a buffer and geostrategic depth for key cities of Pakistan which are at a vulnerable distance from Indian borders and even short range missile strike.

Before we proceed further it is necessary to discuss with the readers two important aspects concerning the Kashmir and general proxy war conducted by Pakistan. India is the only nation against whom hostile neighbours engage in proxy war by supporting the ethnic and ideological insurgents and the jihadi groups inspired by religious fanaticism which has become an integral part of the state policy of Pakistan.

At the root of the proxy war problem is the psyche of the leaders and elites of Pakistan now embodied in the highest command of Pakistan army, considered as the soul of Pakistan. It is like the fabled witch: whose soul live in a parrot or a maynah. Till that bird is killed the evil soul cannot be subdued. India achieved that goal once but allowed the opportunity to emasculate the Pakistan army through the instrument of Simla Agreement 1972, which made the LoC permanent.

The controls the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Joint Intelligence North (JIN) conducts proxy war in Kashmir and the Joint Intelligence Miscellaneous (JIM) jointly with the JIN and JIX conduct jihad warfare in rest of India.

At present the main tool of operation is the Markaz- ud- Dawa al Irshad, the master terrorist organization located at Muridke near Lahore. The main operational tool of the Markaz and the ISI is Lashkar-e-Taiba and Harkat-ul-Jihad al Islami (HuJI). The Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Allah) was established by Hafiz Mohammad Ibrahim and Zafar Iqbal in May 1990 under patronage of the ISI. Initially the volunteers were trained in NWFP and Afghanistan. Later the training facilities were shifted by the ISI in PoK. The head quarter of the Lashkar (Markaz-e-Lashkar) is situated at Muridke. This force, armed to the teeth by Pakistan army, and numbering about 3500 recruits (figure varies) is now totally under control of the ISI and Pakistan army. The Lashkar has not been allowed to mingle with Tehrik-e-Taliban-Pakistan and Al Qaeda factions. However, the Lashkar is utilized mainly in Indian Kashmir, other parts of India on its own or in tandem with United Jihad Council of Syed Salahuddin and a major faction of the HuJI.

HuJI was formed in 1984 by Fazalur Rehman Khalil and Qari Saifullah Akhtar, as the first Pakistan-based jihadist – Islamic terrorist – outfit to fight alongside the Afghan mujahideens against the USSR. Khalil later broke away to form his own group Harkat-ul-Ansar (HuA), which later emerged as the most feared militant organization in Kashmir. After the Afghan war this group was reassembled as Harkat-ul-Mujahideen after HuA was banned by the USA. The HuJI was directed by the ISI to export jihad to the Indian state of J & K. HuJI’s footprint was extended to Bangladesh when the Bangladesh unit was established in 1992, with direct assistance from Osama bin Laden. Illyas Kashmiri group of the HuJI is aligned with both Lashkar-e-Taiba and Al Qaeda. Both HuJI and Lashkar are encouraged to expand operation in Chechnya, Dagestan and other parts of the Russian federation.

The United Jihad Council or Muttahida Jihad Council was formed in 1994 of which Hizb-ul-Mujahideen is the largest and dominating component consisting members from Indian Kashmir and Pakistan. At present the ration of Indian and Pakistani component is 35%-55%. Headquarter of the Council is located near Muzaffarabad and all logistics are supplied by Pakistan army and the ISI. The member components are: Harakat-ul-Ansar, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen, Al-Jihad, Al-Barq, Al-Badr, Ikhwan-ul-Mussalmin, Tehrik-ul-Mujahideen. Around 1999, as many as fifteen organizations were affiliated with the Council. However, the most important components are Lashkar-e-Taiba, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Al-Badr and Tehrik-e-Jihad. Most of these are recognized as terrorist organizations by the US and the UN. The US recently urged Pakistan to eliminate the Lashkar as the high profile attack on Mumbai (26/11) was jointly organized by Pakistan army, ISI, Markaz ud Dawa and the Lashkar. David Coleman Headly Tahawwur Rana now under trial in USA is also connected with Lashkar and Illiyas Kashmiri. Their links with serving Pakistan army officers have been well established by the US investigators.

Osama bin Laden’s Taliban and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan have so far not directly operated in Kashmir. However, Illyas Kashmiri, a Mirpuri PoK national had joined the Special Services group (SSG), a commando force of Pakistan. He later, under ISI direction trained the HuJI and the Afghan mujahideen. Later he broke away with the parent body of HuJI and floated his own outfit Brigade 313. It is affiliated to Al Qaeda and he often directs some of the Lashkar operations. Once he was arrested in India but escaped from jail. Later he was arrested on suspicion of attempt on life of President Musharraf for attack on the Lal Masjid. Kashmiri’s force often independently operates in Indian Kashmir and he was one of the masterminds of the 26/11 attack on Mumbai.

There are satellite images and other ground inputs about patronization of the jihad forces by Pakistan. Till 3 months back Brigadier Rathore was in charge of the Jihad formations and training and arming them with assistance from retired army and ISI officers. It is understood that a new brigadier is in charge of Pakistan’s Kashmir and India operations. Earlier nearly 18 camps were located in NWFP and Punjab. These camps have now been shifted to PoK. According to Indian sources there are 42 live camps in PoK where about 2500 terrorists are undergoing training.

Having discussed the basics let us understand what is Pakistan doing with the PoK and Northern Areas, comprising Gilgit, Baltistan, Skardu etc areas. Understanding POK and Northern Area’s problems would require a brief journey through the pages of history between 1935 and 1947. Sheikh Abdullah and Chaudhri Ghulam Abbas of Muslim Conference had spearheaded the movement for greater devolution of power to the subjects through elected representatives. The vortex of One Nation independence movement spearheaded by the Congress and the creation of Pakistan on the basis of presumed Two Nation theory had also affected the leadership of the Muslim Conference. Sheikh Abdullah charmed Nehru and Newton’s 3rd Law propelled Ghulam Abbas to the lap of Jinnah. These two leaders were willing to arrive at a compromise with Sir Gopalswami Ayeangar, than PM of J&K. The two Kashmiri rivals were united on the issue of opposition to the Maharaja but disunited on most other issues. Their ego bags had no space in a common political geography. In Nehru’s perception Sheikh wielded the key to Kashmir problem. Congress did not consider it necessary to tackle the Maharaja soon after 1940, when it was clear that Jinnah would not stop at anything but partition of India. He wanted his roast to be cooked according to his specifications with Kashmir thrown in as top dressing. Pakistan had not left anything to be decided by the departing British power.

Pakistan Occupied Kashmir comprises of the Muzaffarabad region, adjacent to Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Murree, Manshera and Gujrat etc strategic border areas of Pakistan. By grabbing these areas in 1948 Pakistan acquired a strategic depth against India’s conventional war thrusts. By technically integrating the POK areas with its main territory Pakistan had flagrantly violated the UN resolutions, Tashkent and Simla Agreements. Pundits have elaborated these aspects of Pakistan’s perfidious activities.

Indian mind is not trained to think in terms of understanding that vast areas of the kingdom of Kashmir, besides the Muzaffarabad region described by Pakistan as Azad Kashmir, are under Pakistani and Chinese occupation. These territories of the kingdom of Kashmir, which merged into India, have almost disappeared from Indian memory and are considered as ‘technical cartographic definition.’

The political class and the governments in India have so far not made average Indians aware of the fact that Pakistan had ceded 1/3rd of J&K to China on the strength of assumed parameter ‘the defence of which (the ceded area) is under the actual control of Pakistan.’ What follows from this assumption? Pakistan reserves the right to cede the Gilgit and Baltistan areas of Northern Areas of J&K to China or America on some other strategic consideration on the same plea of de facto military presence in the area. It’s as bad in international law as is the forcible amalgamation of parts of Gaza strip, Western Bank and Golan Heights by Israel. While Pakistan joins voice with other Arab governments to condemn Israel, it has no explanation to give to the people of J&K and India; the legal inheritor of the territories of the Maharaja of J&K. India has also not kept the item on diplomatic dinner plates in Agra, Delhi and Islamabad. The present foreign office diplomats and Track II and III diplomats are also not adding the POK and the Northern Areas including Areas Ceded to China to the menu card.

A detailed reading of the land mass transferred to China in 1963 indicate that Pakistan was preparing the grounds for a decisive round of war against India in 1965 with tacit Chinese help and silent nod from America, which was using Pakistan to build a bridge with China. After the devastating defeat in 1962 a stupefied India could do very little to stop China from grabbing a territory through deceit. Article Two of the treaty delineates the ceded area, which include important Passes like Mintake Daban, Parpik, Yutr Daban, Muztagh, and Karakoram.

The Gilgit and Baltistan tracts of the kingdom of Kashmir are known as Northern Areas. Maharaja of Kashmir occupied the territory in 1842 and the British recognized his sovereignty in 1846. Through a recorded history of turmoil, finally, in 1935 the British Crown assumed firm control of Gilgit Agency through a lease agreement. However, the lease did not terminate sovereignty of the Maharaja. During transfer of power, The British did not consider either India or Pakistan as legal claimants of this territory. Paramountcy was reverted to Srinagar durbar and only the Maharaja had legal rights to transfer that territory either to India or Pakistan.

Pakistan repeated the show it staged by stoking rebellion in Poonch, Mirpur and Kotli. It started negotiating with the figurehead rulers of the area and the Sirdars. Mostly Muslims, the Gilgit Scout was also influenced by Pakistan through local religious leaders, Sirdars and potentates. Like the ‘Provisional Government of POK’ a move was mooted by Shah Rias Khan to set up ‘The Gilgit Republic.’ History bears evidence of Pakistani connectivity of Rias Khan. Delhi or Srinagar could do precious little to intervene decisively as pro-Pakistani British officers controlled military balance. William Brown, the British major in charge of the forces of the Maharaja in his memoir ‘The Gilgit Rebellion’ mentioned that taking advantage of the withdrawal of the British the Pakistani authorities incited the Muslim tribesmen and arranged their congregation in Gilgit town. They were incited to kill Hindu and Sikh officials and other J&K citizen. Absence of authority, especially inability and helplessness of the circumstances of India allured Pakistan to incite Poonch, Mirpur type rebellion under leaders like Rais Khan.

Major Brown was the only military authority in Gilgit and his colleague Captain Mathieson was in Chilas. Brown put the Crown representative Ghansara Singh and his associates under house arrest on the ruse of protecting them. Major Brown came under severe pressure from his superior Col. Bacon at Peshawar and Col. Iskander Mirza, Defence Secretary of Pakistan to declare merger of Gilgit Agency with Pakistan. On the morning of 4th November, he raised Pakistan flag over his headquarters.

The area is divided into five administrative units: Gilgit, Baltistan, Diamir, Ghizer and Ghanche. A population of nearly 2 million inhabits the 72,495 square kilometer geographical spread. The main ethnic groups are Baltis (Balawaris), Yashkuns, Mughals, Kashmiris, Pathans, Ladakhis, Tajik, Uzbek, Mongol, Turkmen and population of Greek origin. Though Pakistan is trying to impose Urdu in the Northern Areas the main languages spoken are, Balti, Shina, Brushaski, Khawer, Wakhi, Turki, Tibeti, and Pushto.

Religious sect-wise breakdown of population in the Northern Areas is:
Gilgit – 60% Shia, 40% Sunni (imported from Pakistan); Nagar- 100% Shia, Hunza, Yasin, Punial, Ishkoman, Gupis- 100% Ismaili (Aghakhani), Chilas, Darel, 100% Sunni, Astor- 90% Sunni and 10% Shia and Baltistan- 98% Shia and 2 % Sunni. There are about 10% Nurbakshis in the Northern Areas. The Sunnis are predominantly Hanafi with sprinkles of Maliki and Hanbali sects.

While the PoK was granted some charade of self rule the Northern Areas were so far directly administered by Islamabad. Discontent at growing Punjabi domination and lack of any kind of self-rule had given rise to the demand of independent Balawaristan by some of the protagonists.

The Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self Governance Order 2009, replaces the Northern Areas Legal Framework Order of 1994. Under the order, Gilgit-Baltistan Assembly will formulate its own Rules of Procedures, while legislation on 61 subjects will be done by a council and an assembly in their respective jurisdictions. The region will not be regarded as a province, as the self-rule has been granted on the pattern of Azad Jammu and Kashmir. The self-governance to Gilgit-Baltistan will have no impact on the future of Kashmir. The Legislative Assembly will elect its own Chief Minister; however, the Legislative Assembly of Gilgit-Baltistan would have no control over defence and treasury. The elections in the areas would be held in October this year. Out of 36 assembly members, 24 would be elected directly whereas seven seats each would be reserved for the technocrats.

Pakistan views this as a landmark step towards integration of the occupied Northern Areas with rest of the country. In their view: The declaration of “Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order 2009” has not only fulfilled the longstanding demand of the people of Northern Areas for self-rule on the lines of AJK type of governance, it will also frustrate the nefarious designs of Indian external strike in Northern Areas. It is beyond doubt that the Northern Areas of Pakistan lag behind the rest of the provinces of the country. Sectarianism, poverty, Indian connection, weak judicial system, burgeoning of small arms, and separatist forces like Balawaristan National Front (BNF), Karakoram National Movement (KNM), are some of the major concerns that had alarmed the NA Administration. Some of the demands put across by the people of Pakistan’s mountainous Northern Areas were: (1) Self-governance like that of AJK or as a province. (2) Fully autonomous Legislative Assembly with Chief Minister. (3) Set up an independent High Court and Supreme Court. (4) The reforms in education set-up, e.g., affairs of Karakoram International University to be straightened, quota for Gilgit Baltistan be separated from FATA, setting-up of Medical College and Engineering College. (5) The Land allotment to non-locals, NGOs and foreign Govts should be banned. (6) Economic Developmental Package for the uplift of common people. (7) Control over the sectarianism. This is far from the truth prevailing on the grounds. Discontent and preparations for armed conflict with Pakistan are growing in the Northern Areas which prompted Islamabad to depute two additional brigades and a large contingent of the ISI and the SSG.

Another issue that is disturbing India is Chinese intrusion both in PoK and the Northern Areas for execution of certain hydroelectric and other infrastructural projects. Pakistan and China signed a memorandum of understanding for construction of Bunji dam in Northern Areas in August 2009. The agreement was signed on behalf of Pakistan’s ministry of water and power and China’s Three Gorges Project Corporation by the Chairman, Board of Investment, Saleem Mandviwala, and Li Yang’an. The ceremony was attended by President Asif Zardari.

“Political and administrative reforms recently announced by Pakistan for its Northern Areas, known officially as Gilgit Baltistan, are basically aimed at providing better security cover for the rapidly growing Chinese interests in the territory. Gilgit, the Northern Areas capital, has acquired the status of a gateway to Central Asia in the wake of a Pakistan-China barter trade agreement and accords with Central Asian states. China has invested heavily in a range of projects in the Northern Areas and is poised to launch several new projects, particularly in power sector, costing billions of dollars. In August 2009, during a visit by Zardari to China, the countries signed a memorandum of understanding on construction of a hydro-power station at Bunji, in Gilgit Baltistan. The countries also agreed in June to allow market access for bilateral trade in 11 services sectors and to intensify their efforts to increase border trade, which constitutes merely 5% of their overall trade, and takes place through the Karakoram Highway (KKH), whose repair and upgrade is likely to be completed by 2012.” Syed Fazl-e-Hyder, in Pakistan acts to guard Chinese interests; Asia Times, September 4, 2009.

India has recently lodged protest with China for undertaking works in the Northern Areas and PoK as these areas are legally parts of India and Pakistan has no right to invite China to carry out development works in Indian Territory without Delhi’s concurrence. The Indian foreign minister is likely to take up this issue with his Chinese counterparts during his forthcoming visit to Beijing.

Having surveyed the panorama of geopolitical status let us examine if India can minimize or prevent Pakistan from launching jihad attacks from its soil against Kashmir in particular and India in General.

Militarily it is not impossible to make precision strike against the terrorist camps in PoK and Punjab. India has the technology to gather intelligence data about these camps. The moot point is can India be determined to launch Israeli like attack and US like strikes? There are risks of a limited war between India and Pakistan that may not turn nuclear. Would the USA support India against the known proclivity of China and Pakistan to internationalize the issue. India does not have sufficient drones to mount precision attack. Conventional advanced bombers and warhorses are not suitable for such attack. Moreover, India, at the 62nd year of proxy war must also evolve a policy to hit Pakistan decisively. This would require a comprehensive policy. Some political parties, which depend on Muslim vote, may not agree for a Bangladesh like operation. However, forward proactive policy remains the best option provided the political policy makers are committed to the cause and the armed forces are given appropriate mandate.

In the face of such impasse India can at best do firefighting in Kashmir and other places. Prolonged fire fighting generates big problem. Such operations alienate the people, allegation of human rights violation are pitted on flimsiest ground. Often excesses are committed by security personnel under conditions of severe stress. This is an intractable situation in an operational theatre. The militants try to terrorize the people to submission and in the process attack vulnerable targets. The security forces are compelled to operate in the populated villages that create hatred and aversion amongst the people. A defensive anti-guerrilla warfare suffers from such inbuilt disadvantages. However, record of the Indian security forces is more on the brighter side that than any isolated dark spots are left by rare acts of callousness.

India has managed to maintain a democratic political structure in the state. Despite Pakistan inspired election boycott by the militants and the separatist Hurriyat Conference etc the people of the state exhibited indomitable courage to turn up to cast vote; nearly 45-60% in different booths. It may be recalled that 40% voting is considered moderately high in disturbed situation. The common Kashmiri pine for peace and stability. They have understood that Pakistan is using them for scoring geostrategic and geopolitical victory over India. By involving China Pakistan is adding international dimension to the conflict. However, there is no organized political platform that can focus on the aversion of the people towards Pakistani interference. Even the leaders of certain parties which talk in ambivalent manner understand that their future is tied up to India and they cannot enjoy freedom in Pakistan. Most of them use shrill anti-India campaign to remain politically relevant.

orruption in public offices has affected the common people adversely. No job can be done without paying the local officers and political leaders. Even for agricultural loan and loans for fruit orchards are available against a premium cut. High cost of implements, pesticide and other inputs has impeded agricultural growth. On top of it the campaign for potato cultivation and cultivation of green vegetables has not been well accepted by villagers. Crop insurance against adverse weather is not available as yet. Introduction of terrace cultivation with adequate irrigation facility is yet to pick up in the lower reach hill areas.
Because of lack of industrial activity and other job opportunities the youth mostly remain unemployed and some of them migrate to other states for running carpet and handloom business. The handloom and handicraft industry are in shambles because of high cost of inputs and paucity of subsidy and grant. There is high potential for sheep breeding and wool harvesting industry, poultry and dairy projects. If properly encouraged by importing high yielding cows and introducing mechanized process Kashmir can emerge as the cheese capital of India. The NABARD has recently opened a one-man office in Srinagar which is neither in a position to conceive projects conducive to Kashmir and Jammu region and offering financial assistance. Economic and administrative neglect has also disappointed the surrendered militants as they have no means of viable livelihood. The degree of disillusionment is on the rise.

Talks with common Kashmiris indicate that they are tired of continuous military operations and violation of human rights. Security of life, women and property are main concerns. A good percentage of them understand the catch 22 situation created by Pakistan sponsored proxy war and jihad and India’s law and order response. They pine for peace and stability and economic advancement. The developmental administration has failed the state almost in every sector. The emphasis of the state and the central administration should be on the battle of winning over hearts of the people. Hopefully, multipronged offensive and defensive military actions would be accompanied by sustained and corruption free developmental activities. War for winning the heart of the people is more important than defensive war against jihadi guerrillas operating from Pakistan.

http://maloykrishnadhar.com/kashmir-the-war-of-arms-and-hearts#comment-8240

Original Boundaries of the Kingdom of Jammu and Kashmir

Kashmir dispute - Situation on Ground

Callous Nehru and Kashmir accession

Sam Manekshaw, the first field marshal in the Indian army, was at the ringside of events when Independent India was being formed. Then a colonel, he was chosen to accompany V P Menon on his historic mission to Kashmir. This is his version of that journey and its aftermath, as recorded in an interview with Prem Shankar Jha.


At about 2.30 in the afternoon, General Sir Roy Bucher walked into my room and said, 'Eh, you, go and pick up your toothbrush. You are going to Srinagar with V P Menon. The flight will take off at about 4 o'clock'. I said, 'why me, sir?'

'Because we are worried about the military situation. V P Menon is going there to get the accession from the Maharaja and Mahajan.' I flew in with V P Menon in a Dakota. Wing Commander Dewan, who was then squadron leader Dewan, was also there. But his job did not have anything to with assessing the military situation. He was sent by the Air Force because it was the Air Force which was flying us in.'

Since I was in the Directorate of Military Operations, and was responsible for current operations all over India, West Frontier, the Punjab, and elsewhere, I knew what the situation in Kashmir was. I knew that the tribesmen had come in - initially only the tribesmen - supported by the Pakistanis.

Fortunately for us, and for Kashmir, they were busy raiding, raping all along. In Baramulla they killed Colonel D O T Dykes. Dykes and I were of the same seniority. We did our first year's attachment with the Royal Scots in Lahore, way back in 1934-5. Tom went to the Sikh regiment. I went to the Frontier Force regiment. We'd lost contact with each other. He'd become a lieutenant colonel. I'd become a full colonel.

Tom and his wife were holidaying in Baramulla when the tribesmen killed them.

The Maharaja's forces were 50 per cent Muslim and 50 per cent Dogra.

The Muslim elements had revolted and joined the Pakistani forces. This was the broad military situation. The tribesmen were believed to be about 7 to 9 kilometers from Srinagar. I was sent into get the precise military situation. The army knew that if we had to send soldiers, we would have to fly them in. Therefore, a few days before, we had made arrangements for aircraft and for soldiers to be ready.

But we couldn't fly them in until the state of Kashmir had acceded to India. From the political side, Sardar Patel and V P Menon had been dealing with Mahajan and the Maharaja, and the idea was that V.P Menon would get the Accession, I would bring back the military appreciation and report to the government. The troops were already at the airport, ready to be flown in. Air Chief Marshall Elmhurst was the air chief and he had made arrangements for the aircraft from civil and military sources.

Anyway, we were flown in. We went to Srinagar. We went to the palace. I have never seen such disorganisation in my life. The Maharaja was running about from one room to the other. I have never seen so much jewellery in my life --- pearl necklaces, ruby things, lying in one room; packing here, there, everywhere. There was a convoy of vehicles.
The Maharaja was coming out of one room, and going into another saying, 'Alright, if India doesn't help, I will go and join my troops and fight (it) out'.

I couldn't restrain myself, and said, 'That will raise their morale sir'. Eventually, I also got the military situation from everybody around us, asking what the hell was happening, and discovered that the tribesmen were about seven or nine kilometres from what was then that horrible little airfield.

V P Menon was in the meantime discussing with Mahajan and the Maharaja. Eventually the Maharaja signed the accession papers and we flew back in the Dakota late at night. There were no night facilities, and the people who were helping us to fly back, to light the airfield, were Sheikh Abdullah, Kasimsahib, Sadiqsahib, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, D P Dhar with pine torches, and we flew back to Delhi. I can't remember the exact time. It must have been 3 o'clock or 4 o'clock in the morning.

(On arriving at Delhi) the first thing I did was to go and report to Sir Roy Bucher. He said, 'Eh, you, go and shave and clean up. There is a cabinet meeting at 9 o'clock. I will pick you up and take you there.' So I went home, shaved, dressed, etc. and Roy Bucher picked me up, and we went to the cabinet meeting.

The cabinet meeting was presided by Mountbatten. There was Jawaharlal Nehru, there was Sardar Patel, there was Sardar Baldev Singh. There were other ministers whom I did not know and did not want to know, because I had nothing to do with them. Sardar Baldev Singh I knew because he was the minister for defence, and I knew Sardar Patel, because Patel would insist that V P Menon take me with him to the various states.
Almost every morning the Sardar would sent for V P, H M Patel and myself. While Maniben (Patel's daughter and de facto secretary) would sit cross-legged with a Parker fountain pen taking notes, Patel would say, 'V P, I want Baroda. Take him with you.' I was the bogeyman. So I got to know the Sardar very well.

At the morning meeting he handed over the (Accession) thing. Mountbatten turned around and said, ' come on Manekji (He called me Manekji instead of Manekshaw), what is the military situation?' I gave him the military situation, and told him that unless we flew in troops immediately, we would have lost Srinagar, because going by road would take days, and once the tribesmen got to the airport and Srinagar, we couldn't fly troops in. Everything was ready at the airport.

As usual Nehru talked about the United Nations, Russia, Africa, God almighty, everybody, until Sardar Patel lost his temper. He said, 'Jawaharlal, do you want Kashmir, or do you want to give it away'. He (Nehru) said,' Of course, I want Kashmir (emphasis in original). Then he (Patel) said 'Please give your orders'. And before he could say anything Sardar Patel turned to me and said, 'You have got your orders'.

I walked out, and we started flying in troops at about 11 o'clock or 12 o'clock. I think it was the Sikh regiment under Ranjit Rai that was the first lot to be flown in. And then we continued flying troops in. That is all I know about what happened. Then all the fighting took place. I became a brigadier, and became director of military operations and also if you will see the first signal to be signed ordering the cease-fire on 1 January (1949) had been signed by Colonel Manekshaw on behalf of C-in-C India, General Sir Roy Bucher. That must be lying in the Military Operations Directorate.
Excerpted from Kashmir 1947, Rival Versions of History, by Prem Shankar Jha, Oxford University Press, 1996

The Problem Of Pakistan

I will first sketch the history of and the situation in Pakistan, and then suggest a range of options. Throughout the piece, I will use “Jihadist groups” as an umbrella term for groups including the Kashmiri terrorists, LET, UJC, AQ, Taliban, and the like. My apologies to those who see Jihad as an internal spiritual struggle; I cannot think of a more efficient term.

In 1965, Old Pakistan tried unsuccessfully to annex the part of Kashmir that fell to India during the spoils of independence / partition. Six years later, in 1971, an East Pakistan (Bengali) based party won national elections. Because the party was East Pakistan based, the West Pakistan dominated military refused to recognize the election results, and launched a coup. What followed was an incredibly bloody suppression of a Bengali insurgency. The West Pakistani military action caused the killing of about 1.5 million people in a space of nine months; that would average out at five thousand killings every day during the whole of those nine months. These are controversial numbers, difficult to verify, so I have halved the numbers claimed by Bangladesh. Ten million Bengalis became refugees in India. India started to support the insurgency, and Pakistan declared war on India at the end of 1971. With the help of Bengali insurgents, India forced a surrender of Pakistani forces in the area, and East Pakistan became independent Bangladesh.

In nearly forty years of independence, Bangladesh has coexisted peacefully with both Pakistan and India, viewing neither as a threat or even a rival. It should be noted here Bangladesh’s population is roughly equal to that of Pakistan, and is about 90% Muslim. On the other hand, West Pakistan took ownership of the identity of Old Pakistan – viewing India as a rival and a threat, and itself as the lands of the Muslims of the subcontinent. It did this despite having just lost about half of its population to Bangladesh, and being reduced to a nation of Punjabis, Sindhis, and a host of peoples in the mountainous Northwest of the subcontinent. West Pakistan chose to overlook its slaughter of up to three million Bangladeshis (West Pakistan would point out in its defense that it murdered and raped a disproportionately high number of Hindus). Instead, West Pakistan held India fully responsible for the breakup of Old Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh. West Pakistan (henceforth Pakistan) forged a new Pakistani national psyche, which dramatically reinforced India as Pakistan’s existential nemesis. Pakistan forthwith embarked on its project to acquire nuclear weapons. The nuclear weapons project was easily accelerated in the 80s because the West was happy to look the other way. In exchange, Pakistan channeled Western money to Jihadist forces, among others, in order to overthrow the Soviet backed regime in Afghanistan. The channeling of vast moneys through the ISI made it much more powerful, even as it was radicalized both by its common cause with Jihadist forces, and by the Islamization under General Zia.

The end of the 80s saw Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, and the successful conclusion of anti-Soviet action in Afghanistan by the alliance of the West, the Jihadist forces among others, and Pakistan’s ISI. The former gave Pakistan carte blanche to pursue any military action against India short of a frontal assault; the latter placed at Pakistan’s disposal, a considerable Jihadist force and the bureaucratic / political structure (ISI) to manage these forces. Pakistan decided to capitalize on the sense of grievance in the Muslim majority state of Kashmir over two instances of opportunistic behavior by the Congress party earlier in the 80s (the Congress had behaved similarly in most other Indian states). Accordingly, it set up extensive terrorist training camps in Pakistani Kashmir, and unleashed a violent, partially Jihadist insurgency in Indian Kashmir. One of the first actions of this insurgency was to carry out an ethnic cleansing of Hindus from the Kashmir valley. This insurgency has continued since, claiming on average three thousand lives every year. Pakistan’s usual rationalization for supporting this partially Jihadi insurgency is that it helps defend Pakistan by keeping a large part of the Indian army tied down in Kashmir. This reasoning is patently absurd: India could retain territorial control over Kashmir during any hostilities with a fraction of the army it currently needs to maintain law and order. Besides, Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent should forestall any hostile intentions India may ever have had. Meanwhile, among the various groups that Pakistan supported to a greater or lesser extent, the Taliban not only consolidated its hold over most of a fractious Afghanistan, but also became a reliable ally of Pakistan until 9/11 shook things up a little.

The past two decades in Pakistan have been characterized by an unstable political equilibrium. There are three important political factions: The Bhutto party with its base in Sindh, the Sharif party with its base in Punjab, and the military with its base in a combination of raw power, and popular dissatisfaction with the extreme corruption in the other two political factions. Neither the Bhutto nor the Sharif faction has compromised on their core interest of corruption: neither party has indicated an interest in good governance as a means of staying in power. The military, though more interested in good governance than the others, has not compromised on its core interest of absolute power – has not accepted any power sharing as a means of co-opting ambitious civilians. All three factions share the national consensus about supporting the violent, partially Jihadist insurgency in Kashmir. All three have a similar approach to the Taliban, namely, that they are a core ally of Pakistan who must be protected even as Pakistan needs to guard itself against some of their excesses. All three also approve of groups, which carry out bombings of movie houses, markets, commuter trains, and the like in major Indian cities every few months. The most “spectacular” of these were the attacks on various targets in Bombay including the Taj Mahal hotel and the Victoria Terminus railway station.

For those inclined to deem this a rather harsh assessment of Pakistani political players, consider the following sample of responses (largely from moderate parties or moderate military figures at a time when Pakistan had great external pressures and incentives to act moderately:

* General Musharraf cut deals with the Jihadi forces by ceding parts of FATA to them and allowed other Jihadi groups like LET full freedom to operate in Pakistan; all this despite the fact that these groups supposedly tried to assassinate Musharraf himself on at least three different occasions.
* When Ms. Bhutto was assassinated by Jihadi groups, her party directed blame at elements in the government allied to those groups rather than at the groups themselves. Part of this was because it was more expedient to blame the government (governing party) during an election campaign. But part of it is also because of the reluctance to openly criticize Jihadi groups. This latter construction is reinforced as Ms. Bhutto’s widower recently concluded a deal with the Taliban in which the government ceded the Swat valley to the Taliban. The Taliban has promptly taken control of the lucrative emerald mining operations in the area.
* For several weeks after the Indian government released the names and addresses of the Bombay attackers, the Pakistani government refused to admit that any of the attackers was Pakistani. Indeed, Mr. Sharif was raked over the coals when, within a couple of weeks, he acknowledged that the captured attacker at least was Pakistani. Along similar lines, in the wake of the recent attack on the Sri Lanka cricket team, a Pakistani minister promptly blamed the Indian government for carrying out the attacks. The MO of the Pakistani political establishment is always the same: while they vehemently condemn terrorist attacks (thereby giving the appearance of sanity), they rarely attribute it to any group (other than the Indian government). This lack of attribution preempts any obligation to publicly condemn the Jihadi groups.
* When faced with Jihadi groups induced instability: increased suicide bombings in Pakistan including in Punjab, the tenseness surrounding the attacks on Bombay, the attack on the Sri Lanka cricket team, the ceding of Swat to the Taliban after a vicious campaign including wide spread school burnings, and the like crises, the Bhutto faction responded not by trying to undermine the Jihadi groups, but rather by trying to undermine the Sharif faction. Accordingly, they have packed the courts with partisans, and recently both Mr. Sharif, and his brother (the governor of Punjab), were disqualified from running for office. The Bhutto faction backed down only after massive street protests threatened its own hold on power.

The foregoing represents what we can expect from the Pakistani political establishment under any modification of business as usual. The reason for this is simple if rather uncomfortable, namely, that the central and defining element of what it means to be Pakistani is a hatred of India. This is not to suggest that every single Pakistani Muslim hates India (only an overwhelming majority do), or that it is a consuming passion (most have more immediate and concrete matters to preoccupy them). Rather, the view that India is Pakistan’s existential nemesis is assumed to be a self-evident truth. This has made hatred of India the preeminent national value. Establishing extreme anti-Indian bona fides has become a surefire shortcut to legitimation for any group whatever. Any Jihadi group knows that it only has to establish its anti-Indian bona fides (by fighting in Kashmir, bombing Indian civilians, or in any other way) to have carte blanche to do anything in Pakistan (including killing Pakistanis). As long as the extreme anti-Indian sentiment and the legitimation shortcut exists, and it will under any business as usual scenario, Pakistani Jihadi groups will be ineradicable.

But is the current unstable equilibrium satisfactory for the primary stakeholders? I will focus only on Pakistan, America, and India (Afghanistan is powerless to effect any change, so I will ignore it). All three stakeholders have grounds for dissatisfaction. Pakistanis are dealing with a deteriorating and unstable equilibrium. Extremists have struck in the heart of Punjab, the Pakistani army is often engaged on the front at the frontier, and Pakistan has become the centre of much unpleasant international attention. America has sunk a lot of money and prestige in its Afghanistan operation, and would dearly like to proclaim it a success. There is also a significant if quite minor security angle to the American operation. India has become more integrated into the global economy. Spectacular attacks like those on international hotels in Bombay are likely to jeopardize India’s status as a business and investment destination much more than the mundane attacks on commuter trains and movie houses.

Yet it may be more than arguable that the unstable equilibrium is preferable to the unknown consequences of any action that would disrupt business as usual. It cannot hurt to remind ourselves of the different responses of India and America to comparable attacks. India has largely taken them in its stride without making a big fuss. As a consequence, it has continued to maintain an 8% growth rate even as several hundred people are killed every year in bombings, and a few thousand in Kashmir every year (the latter are primarily Kashmiris unsympathetic to the Indian cause). A severe disruption of the status quo could have the highest cost for India since it shares a long and at places an unmanageable border with a nuclear Pakistan (think dirty bombs), not to mention that its important cities are within range of Pakistani missiles.. Gaurav has suggested that India can reduce the adverse effects of spectacular attacks on India’s international image as an investment destination by a few careful media regulations. Starving western (and probably Indian) media of video feeds would turn these from “spectacular” attacks to mundane deaths and killings worth only perfunctory coverage.

America has already paid the price for disturbing a stable if unpalatable equilibrium in Iraq. Indeed the primary victory of the 9/11 attackers was in knocking America off balance psychologically. What should have been no more than a $200 billion loss has turned into a multitrillion loss (the worth of the lives lost in the 9/11 attacks was only about $20 billion assuming the rather generous $6 million per life used by the government in its usual cost benefit analysis). America could settle for maintaining a nominal, internationally recognized client regime in Kabul. America could check Jihadi forces by retaining the right to bomb targets of interest all over Afghanistan. Under such an arrangement, even if the Taliban held parts of the country (nonhostile warlords would hold most of the rest), they would not be much more of a threat to American security than they are now. In the alternative, America could actually try to win hearts and minds by helping the people of the area. No one in the region save the Jihadi forces regard America as an existential nemesis: indeed, America has been a friend of several Afghan groups in the past and present, and has been Pakistan’s most loyal ally for decades. Unfortunately, this is not a practical solution since America will need to spend significant money in helping the region’s peoples. The American people and foreign establishment have shown themselves far more willing to spend $100 billion on killing and occupying a people and their lands (it is called “supporting the troops”) than spend $1 billion on helping those people.

Pakistan has little to lose from the unstable equilibrium. It can revel in its national identity as the lands of the subcontinent’s Muslims by nurturing extreme Islamic groups, and by continuing to be a thorn in India’s side by supporting a partially Jihadi insurgency in Kashmir, and terrorist attacks by Jihadi groups in India. Pakistan will not need to acknowledge its role in the slaughter of millions in Bangladesh, fulfill its duties as a nuclear armed nation, or face the consequences of exporting terrorism to other countries.

But what if the unstable equilibrium ceases to be an equilibrium, and becomes a slippery slope where the Jihadi forces have a real shot at getting power in Islamabad? Though still very improbable, this scenario is not as outlandish as it was even a couple of years ago. If Pakistan were not nuclear armed, the world might have allowed the struggle between fundamentalist and moderate groups to play itself out over the customary few decades. However, its nuclear status ensures that the world will not leave Pakistan alone if there is a threat of a fundamentalist takeover. Such is the price to be paid for becoming a significant power! With this in view, I will discuss some of the measures that can be taken by outside players (America and the international community) to forestall this outcome. It should be understood that these measures should be considered only when the equilibrium is seriously threatened, or if there is a very high chance of the measure succeeding. The equilibrium persists because Islamic fundamentalists have never garnered significant support in the key provinces of Punjab and Sindh, which contain close to 80% of Pakistan’s population. It will not be seriously threatened unless extremist parties gain significant support in Punjab. Currently, they hold around 1% of the seats in Punjab, and received just over 2% of the nationwide vote. However, we must remember that the government of NWFP surrendered Swat to the Taliban despite the extremists winning just over 10% of the seats and votes in NWFP. Thus, “significant” support which should trigger the softer option means anything approaching a double digit share o the vote, and “substantial” support which should trigger the hard line option means a vote share well short of the 29% that gave the PMLN a near majority in the Punjab.

The softer option is to exert extreme economic pressure on Pakistan to achieve definite outcomes. The economic conditions must include generous aid on the one hand, and extreme sanctions including extreme trade sanctions and denial of practical access to international financial institutions on the other. The outcome sought should amount to no less than a revamping of Pakistan’s identity. This would include among others: taking strong action against all terrorist groups, surrendering all listed government officials to an international court to face charges of supporting terrorism (the names of a few ISI officials submitted by America to the UN can be the starting point for such a list), a settlement of all outstanding issues with India by a date certain (de facto acceptance of the status quo), and a revamping of the education system to exclude not only extreme Islamism, but also extreme anti-Indian sentiment. Pakistan has a recent record of changing the course of governments through popular pressure. A sufficiently tight squeeze on all sectors of society couple with generous incentives and an effective public campaign could well deliver even such a radical shakeup. These would doubtless be seen by Pakistan as humiliating conditions, and an assault on its national identity. But one must also remember that the right to support and orchestrate terrorist attacks in India has been seen by Pakistan as a nonnegotiable part of its national identity. A very mild version of this option is seen in the Obama administration making significant aid to Pakistan conditional on Pakistan stopping its support of groups, which carry out terrorist attacks in India. Even this version, which only asks Pakistan to stop supporting terrorist groups (as distinct from taking action against them), has become quite controversial.

The more hard line option involves a redrawing of the regional map, and a dissolution of Pakistan. The redrawing would create ethnic nations in the area. Thus, Punjab, Sindh, and most of Baluchistan would become their own nations. Northeast Baluchistan, NWFP, and FATA would be joined with southern and eastern Afghanistan to form a Pashtunistan. The rest of Afghanistan would form its own nation, or choose to be absorbed into neighboring nations like Tajikistan, Uzbekistan or Iran, based on regional demographics. There would have to be a solution for the Pakistani regions of AK and FANA, which will not ally them with Punjab. The military action would need to be NATO based, and exclude India to avoid a nuclear incident. Naturally, this solution should be implemented only when the extremists gain substantial support in Punjab.

Though this is a high risk strategy, there are a couple of reasons why it is likely to deliver the best long term outcome for all the peoples involved. The two most prominent recent examples of failed states falling to Islamic extremists are Afghanistan and Somalia. Both were riven by ethnic or clan factions. Since the primary role of traditional governments is to reallocate resources, a factionalized nation is much more likely to be unstable due to competition among the factions for a larger share. Islamic governments hold out not only the prospect of religion as a unifying force amid the actions; they proclaim that their primary role is the establishment of an Islamic way of life. This is what made the Islamic fundamentalist regimes (the one in Somalia was not particularly intolerant) remarkably stable until they were overthrown by foreign invasions. Pakistan also has strong regional factions, which would find an Islamic fundamentalist regime attractive in difficult circumstances, and find self-determination attractive if it can be easily achieved. As mentioned before, Islamic fundamentalism has a greater draw for Pakistan, which sees itself as the lands of the subcontinent’s Muslims, and which sees largely Hindu India as its existential nemesis.

I have mentioned before how the visceral anti-Indian sentiment among Pakistani people gives any groups that attack India and Indians a shortcut to legitimation. This visceral anti-Indian sentiment is unlikely to survive a dissolution of Pakistan. The largest postdissolution nation would be Punjab with a population around 8% of the Indian population, and an area barely a quarter of the current Pakistan. The fiction that this nation comprises the lands of the subcontinent’s Muslims would be even more difficult to maintain. Any credible rivalry with India will be equally unrealistic. The new nations would likely settle into a pattern of peaceful coexistence similar to Bangladesh. Like Bangladesh they will derive their national identity from internal cultural history rather than by positing an external nemesis. Western hopes about Pakistan have always rested on the hypothesis that the moderate peoples of the Punjab and Sindh can be leveraged to defeat the Jihadi forces in the frontier regions. However, given the virulent anti-Indian (and increasingly anti-American) sentiments, the Jihadi forces have found it much easier to manipulate the sentiments and resources of Punjab and Sindh. There is no chance that this situation will change organically in the next few decades. Dissolution of Pakistan will starve the Jihadi forces of the logistical, human and technological resources of Punjab and Sindh. They will therefore become much less dangerous, and their smaller inconsequential state will be easier to manage. The moderateness of the people of Punjab and Sindh, when freed from the polarizing influence of anti-Indian sentiment in a postdissolution situation, will likely create modern secular nations concerned with economic progress.

The three broad options I have laid out here: the status quo, the softer option of squeezing the Pakistani people to deliver an overhaul of their institutions and identity, and the hard-line option of the redrawing of the regional map are not necessarily preferable in a descending order. Indeed, the probable outcomes would make them preferable in an ascending order. It is primarily my risk-averseness and cost benefit analysis approach to civilian casualties that makes me rank them as I do. It is important to understand that if Pakistan starts sliding down a slippery slope, the mild half-hearted policies that have marked the international approach to Pakistan hitherto will be dangerously ineffective. The options I have outlined here are among the more credible approaches to avoid the serious consequences of a nuclear Pakistan turning into a failed state. Policy makers must have clear thresholds for deploying these options, based on the extent of support for extremists in Punjab. Until then we will continue to see the half-hearted pressure for superficial results, which will not address the need for the overhaul of the Pakistani institutions and identity that make it susceptible to Jihadist forces.

The Trouble With Azaadi

Towards the end of her impassioned appeal calling for azaadi for Kashmir, Arundhati Roy, pauses to reflect on what might follow azadi in Kashmir, wondering what an independent Kashmir might mean, including what the independence demanded by the state's Muslim majority might mean for the state's religious or other minorities. She does well not to linger, because the thought experiment illustrates precisely what is most problematic about "national movements", namely that they are unable to think the political except through the prism of nation-states. National movements, that is to say, see themselves as nation-states-in-waiting, and do not see any political horizon beyond that of the nation-state. So was it with the Indian national movement, and its inability to think the difference that might have been capacious enough to house the country's Muslim-majority regions; so it definitely was with the Muslim League and its two-nation theory, even more wedded to the siren song of European-style nationalism transplanted to a colonial setting; and so it is with the "copycat" nationalisms that have followed, be it Kashmir, or Punjab, or Nagaland. The failure to imagine a nation-state different from the traditional European model, the shoe-horning of Indian communitarian identities, into models conceived with the likes of Germany and England in mind, paved the way for the catastrophes of partition. The "belated" nationalisms of the post-partition sub-continent demonstrate the truth of Marx's depressing observation, namely that we learn from history that we do not learn from history.

The point is worth making given Roy's trenchant critiques of the Indian state (in the context of Kashmir, but not only of Kashmir; her essay on the Indian state and dams, The Greater Common Good, is astonishingly powerful). That is, much of Roy's critique -- of the Indian state's indifference, its callousness, its inhumanity, its cruelty -- is (or certainly ought to be) animated not by her target's Indianness, but by the fact that it is a nation-state, and as such, does what nation-states do: in the final analysis, sacrifice humanity in the service of a larger political project. The distinction is an important one, because nothing in the Kashmiri independence movement suggests that it will throw up anything different; indeed given that the movement aims at a traditional nation-state just like all the others, I submit that it cannot yield a different result. Minority rights? Justice for different communities, and between genders? The outcomes will be better than they are now, we are told by the movement, not because the aims are different from those of the existing Indian state, but because the movement will simply do a better job.

I am skeptical, and not because of the identity (religious or otherwise) of those who comprise the Kashmiri independence movement; I am skeptical because the aim of that movement is congenitally incapable of producing a result that is "better" in some cosmic sense -- at most the identities of those disadvantaged will shift, as new disfavoured minorities, new "outsiders", new "insiders", and new identity policemen are created. Roy is too sophisticated not to see this, but doesn't bother to delve into it, pretending that this is merely a question of the Kashmiri separatists not having spelled out their agenda in greater detail as yet.

It is not: over half a century ago, Hannah Arendt wrote (in The Origins of Totalitarianism) of the masses of refugees and victims that seemed to accompany the birth of every new nation-state, and nothing has changed, not in the age of South Ossetia, Kosovo, Rwanda, ad nauseum. Certainly, those of us from the sub-continent should be especially wary of political projects that promise us clean solutions to intractable political problems: we live with the legacies of the bloodbaths of the 1940s, not to mention innumerable later, "lesser" massacres. By all accounts, the leaders of the new nation-states of India and Pakistan were caught by surprise by the scale of the violence in 1947; they had evidently internalized the logic of colonialism, pursuant to which communitarian difference presents a political "problem" that may be solved by means of creative cartography and judicious population transfers. Conceptual neatness is one of the hallmarks of the colonial mindset (thinking of Cyril Radcliffe, who could doubt it?).

Unfortunately, reality is anything but, and the sub-continent's leaders -- and, even more importantly, its people -- should have learned long ago that partitions are not the solution to people's inability to live together; rather, the mindset that vests its faith in drawing easily-policed borders is a mindset that demands enemies. It is a mindset that, in the final analysis, demands that facts on the ground correspond to the political project of the nation-state (and not the other way around). A nation-state for Muslims thus becomes a state virtually free of non-Muslims; a sub-national state where Hindu pride is honoured above all else becomes a state where non-Hindus must know their place.

Why would one ever hope for anything different from a nation-state for Kashmiris, as far as those who don't fit the bill are concerned? Certainly the region is not short of candidates for stigmatisation (some of this is because India is fantastically diverse; some of it is because nation-states are rather gifted at manufacturing "problematic" identities): Buddhists; Shiites; Gujjars; perhaps even Sunni Muslims who will be deemed insufficiently supportive of the independence movement (the last is hardly far-fetched, as even a casual glance at the history of Algeria or the Khalistan movement, or Kashmir itself during the 1990s, makes clear). Indeed, several hundred thousand Kashmiri Pandits have already been driven off, and it is hard not to see in them a harbinger of more to come.

The above might seem like an odd place from which to maintain a defense of India vis-à-vis Kashmir. It is, on the contrary, a natural vantage point: the idea of an independent Kashmir for Kashmiris must be resisted precisely because, as the experience of the once-colonised has amply illustrated, nation-states are appallingly inhuman. Equally, however, they are not all inhuman in precisely the same way; nor are they all equally inhuman, by which I simply mean that they are not all equally incapable of accommodating human difference, whether communitarian or otherwise. The Germany of 2008 is manifestly not the Germany of 1938; but nor does the Germany of 2008 accommodate ethnic minorities as comfortably as the United States does.

None of this relieves any state of moral responsibility for the horrors it perpetrates; but in order to agitate against horrors, one must first understand what they are. And within the range of nation-states on offer -- all of them problematic, all of them complicit in cruelty -- it is apparent to me that those premised on explicit notions of religion, language, ethnicity, blood in some sense, are more problematic, more complicit, than those with far more modest litmus tests. The contemporary United States, Brazil, South Africa, and, yes, India, are among the latter group of nation-states; Germany, Italy, Pakistan, and, based on the logic of the movements, the would-be nation-states of Kashmir or Khalistan, are not. Theoretically, one does not need to be other than "wholly Bengali", "wholly Tamil", or "wholly Muslim" in order to be utterly Indian; one cannot say the same of Pakistan and its Hindus citizens, and the religious colour of the Kashmiri movement means it is almost inconceivable that this won't be true of an independent Kashmir as well (even leaving aside the obvious ethnic dimension).

Indeed, even if one were to take the likes of Yasin Malik at their word, they promise no more than Jawaharlal Nehru did, that is to say a secular state where all who live in Kashmir, of whatever ethnicity or religious persuasion, will be equal in the eyes of the state; but why and how could such a project -- essentially the same Nehruvian show on a smaller stage -- yield a better result? On the contrary, all the signs are that an independent Kashmir would be more like Pakistan than India: not because both are Muslim majority (that is irrelevant to the point I am making), but because both movements are explicitly predicated on a favoured community that is less than everyone who lives within the state's borders.

Why does any of this matter? Because nation-states where "second-class" citizenship is merely implicit -- think the United States prior to de-segregation; I assume Roy would include India; but really one could argue some are always more equal than others in all nation-states -- can be called out on their failures. Such nation-states are guilty of hypocrisy, but hypocrisy is not the worst sin; indeed hypocrisy, by opening up a gap between theory and practice, between promise and reality, makes it possible to hold a mirror up to the state, to try and compel it to honour its own promise to itself; and enables us to argue that the nation-state is only imperfectly itself until it takes a good long look in that mirror.
The same does not hold true of nation-states where “second-class” citizenship is explicit, where it is part of the very logic of the state. The distinction may be illustrated by the point that while the Jim Crow South is unforgiveable, the civil rights movement and Martin Luther King's "I Have a Dream" moment are possible in a USA where actual practice had made a mockery of the nation-state's constitutional guarantees of equal protection under the laws; they would not be possible in the face of apartheid South Africa, which could not be reformed, simply destroyed. That is, it is far more difficult, perhaps insurmountably so, to call the nation-state to task where it has promised and can promise nothing different than what it offers (one can rebel and try and dismantle the state, but one can't make it see the problem): beyond a point, a "Pakistan for Pakistanis", that is to say for Pakistanis of all religious persuasions, would make no sense, and would undermine the national idea (substitute "ethnicities" for "religious communities" and the idea of Pakistan becomes more flexible; it should come as no surprise that the movement for ethnic justice, greater federalism, and rights for smaller provinces, has far more legs in Pakistan than any movement for the rights of religious minorities; ethnicity illustrates the potential flexibility, but also the limits, of the idea of Pakistan; and even with respect to ethnicity, the difference of even a Bengali Muslim identity that was deemed "too Hindu" by the Pakistani establishment could not be accommodated within the state).

A "Kashmir for Kashmiris" is far closer to the idea of Pakistan than to the Nehru's India, and perhaps closest of all to Bangladesh, seeking to compress both 1947 and 1971 in one secessionist moment. Roy would do well to remember the "Biharis" stranded in refugee camps in Bangladesh since 1971, in the final analysis Muslim but not Bangladeshi enough; not Bengali enough for their own purposes; and not the right kind of Muslim for Pakistan’s purposes. And Roy herself mentions the 1971 genocide of Bengalis by the Pakistani army. The promise of the Kashmiri movement combines both of these nightmares.

None of this is about the decency or lack thereof of Mirwaiz Farooq, or Yasin Malik, or anyone else. The question isn't whether these are or are not upstanding politicians who genuinely believe that Kashmir belongs to all Kashmiris, Hindu, Muslim, Buddhist, or Sikh, or not; the more important question concerns the logic of what they let loose in the world (more accurately, the logic that they and would-be nationalists of all stripes have attempted to replicate for decades). The azadi demanded by the Kashmiri movement, and used by Roy as a rallying cry, is not the answer to that question; the freedom we need is azadi from the mindset that thinks of peoples and communities only in terms of nation-states; and equally, an azadi that demands that the Indian state honour its promise, to itself and to us.
The nation-state as political Alpha and Omega was problematic in its European birthplaces to begin with; to continue to cling to it as the last best hope of ethnic or religious minorities in milieus like India's (or Africa's, or the Balkans'; pick your poison), in the wake of the man-made disasters that have befallen us over the last century, is nothing short of bankrupt.