Pak Media Outraged with Indo-US conspiracy

Indignation with India’s alleged “belligerence” marks Pakistan’s English language press on Wednesday. Newspaper editorials reject the evidence
that the 26/11 terrorists came from Pakistan. Instead, they find India and US ganging up on Pakistan, which they say is the real “victim” of terror.

Dawn’s editorial titled “A go-ahead for India?” says US president-elect Obama is stoking India-Pakistan hostilities. “American presidents have worked for peace, especially after the two countries acquired nuclear status. However, last Monday, president-elect Barack Obama seemed to have ditched this time-honoured American policy. There are concerns (in Pakistan) that India has benefited from the war on terror and has managed to advance its national interests. Overreaction to New Delhi’s demands would mean disastrous consequences for the region.”

The theme finds resonance in the popular daily from Peshawar and Quetta, the Frontier Post. Its editorial says, “Their (India’s) perceivable intent to link up the Mumbai holocaust’s perpetrators to Pakistan and then to al-Qaida is clearly intended to cash in — diplomatically, politically and militarily — on the current American assertions that it is now not Iraq or Afghanistan but Pakistan which is turning into al-Qaida’s haven.”

The pointing finger swings to India. The editorial adds, “With its demarche served on Islamabad, New Delhi has ratcheted up tensions to a perilous pitch which, if it doesn’t pull back, could go out of hand and boil over into an eventuality...It (India) cannot expect Pakistan to pay up the price for its own security and intelligence apparatus’s collapse. Nor can Pakistan become the guinea pig of its political compulsions or electoral necessities. It indeed is with a pinch of salt that one can take even its evidence.”

THE MAKING OF A TERRORIST

After the terror strike in Mumbai on November 26, the continuation of the probe and identification of the culprits depends on the evidence.Does India have evidence that the men who attacked Mumbai came from Pakistan? That they were recruited and trained and sent by Pakistan-based groups? Even now, ten days after the attack, the war over the evidence continues to escalate. Even today when the headlines were dominated by Pakistan's supposed promise that they would act against the Lashkar-e-Taiba. Pakistan clarified that they have made no such promise and once again asked India to come up with evidence to back its claims. At the centre of India's evidence is Mohammed Ajmal Amir, the terrorist who is in India's custody. It is his story, which nails any doubts about where these men came from. Here is the full definitive account of the making of Mohammad Ajmal Amir Qasab in his own words.

Qasab: The coordinates
Name: Mohammed Ajmal Amir Qasab
Father: Mohammed Amir Imam Qasab
Occupation: Dahi Puri stall
Mother: Noor-e-Tai
Address: Village Faridkot, Dipalpur Tehsil, Okara district
Uncles: Nazir residing at Chamiayya Chisti, Lakhirpur Road and Manzoor residing at Safawala Chowk, Lahore

Qasab: The early years
Qasab said that he studied till class 4 at a government primary school and went to Lahore in 2000 after leaving school. He then stayed with brother Afzal in galli number 54, room number 12, mohalla, Toit Abad, near Yadgar Minar, Lahore.He said he did labour jobs at different places till 2005. In 2005, he had quarrel with my father and left home. He said, he went to Ali Hajveri Darbar at Lahore, for a home for runaway boys.From robbery to terrorismIt's at this home for runaway boys that the turning point came. Qasab met a man called Shafiq with whom he worked it seemed in a restaurant. Shafiq introduced him to a man Muzaffar with whom he would enter a life of petty criminality the first step towards becoming a terrorist.Qasab said that he came in contact with Muzaffar Lal Khan, resident of Romiya Village, Atak Tehsil. He then decided to enter into dacoity to make more money. He hired a flat at Bangash Colony, Rawalpindi. Qasab told they needed firerarms for the job and in search of firearms, we saw some LeT stalls at Raja Bazaar, Rawalpindi. We decided to join the LeT for weapons training. Mohammed Ajmal Amir Qasab identified in Faridkot? An article in newspaper Observer has reported that electoral lists for Faridkot shows a Mohammed Amir and that his national identity card number obtained. A villager is quoted saying that we know that boy (caught in Mumbai) is from Faridkot and they knew him from the first night (of the attack). "They brainwash our youth about jihad, there are people who do it in this village. It is so wrong," the villager told the Observer. "Faridkot is active recruiting ground for LeT. Qasab has not lived in Faridkot for four years; visited family once a year. Qasab frequently talked of freeing Kashmir from Indian rule," he added.

Qasab: Training to be LeT
Qasab had three rounds of training to be a Let militant.

Round 1 Qasab told the investigators that they were given Rs 200 and asked to go to Marqas Taiyyaba, Muridke. The first round of training called Daura-Sufa went on for 21 days. There were lectures on Hadis, Quran by Mufti Sayeed. The routine during the round was -- rest, lunch, namaz, PT, games, namaz and dinner.

Round 2 The second round was called Daura-aam or which also took 21 days. It was held at Mansehra, Buttal village. The weapons training was given by Abdul Rehman. The weapons mainly were AK-47, Green-O, SKS, Uzi guns, pistol, revolver. The routine included rest, lunch, namaz, PT, games, namaz and dinner.He said that they took a break to do Khidmat or service for two months.

Round 3 The third round of training, called Daura-Khas, went on for three months. It was held at Chelabandi Pahadi area. The Weapons instructor this time was Abu Mawiya and they were trained to operate weapons such as hand grenades, rocker launcher and mortar. The lectures were given on Indian security agencies.Countdown to the missionQasab said that out of 32 trainees, 16 were selected for confidential operation by Zaqi-ur-Rehman, who was also called chacha. Out of 16 selected, three ran away. "Thirteen trainees were then sent for two rounds of training to Muridke camp. We were taught swimming, shown clippings of atrocities on Muslims in India and took lectures on RAW," he said.

Mission Mumbai
The final ten
Date: September 15, 2008
Qasab and Ismail: Team CST-- Abu Aksha and Abu Umar, Bada Abdul Rehman and Abu Ali, Chotta Abdul Rehman and Afadulla, and Shoaib and Abu UmerQasab said they were shown film on CST station and were told to kidnap people and take them on a roof of the building. He said we then had to contact Abdul Rahman, who would give numbers of TV channels and we were to contact them on phone and make demands for releasing hostages."We were to move on September 27, but it got cancelled. We stayed at Karachi and practised travelling by speed boats. We finally moved on November 23," he said.

The Kuber inventory: Traces of evidence?
The empty packets of 50 rounds of bullets for .34 bore gun. Made in China.
Pink foam wrapping weapon.
Nylon rope used to transfer goods from mother ship to vessel.
Yellow bag made of nylon strings tied together, which had blood-like stains on the inside.
16 multi-coloured blankets.
A namaaz kerchief in black and white with the label "Cashmilan Best Qlty, Phone 061 4516729."
Black quarter pants with the label South Pole, Made in Pakistan.
Four boxes of detergent with the label Pakistan.
Two sachets of Nestle Milk Pak, Nestle Pakistan Limited.
Two black leather belts.
Eight pencil cell batteries from Duracell.
Eight razors of the brand Gelite.
Shaving cream, brand Touchme, Made in Pakistan.
Dental cream, brand Medicam, Made in Pakistan.
Tissue paper, brand Zik Brothers, Karachi.
55 litre plastic tank made in the Gulf. The address on it: HO No 8, Industrial area Karachi, Pakistan. Contact Number: 042577488-9, 0425770811.

Strategic Motivations for the Mumbai Attack

Last Wednesday evening, a group of Islamist operatives carried out a
complex terror operation in the Indian city of Mumbai. The attack was not complex because of the weapons used or its size, but in the apparent training, multiple methods of approaching the city and excellent operational security and discipline in the final phases of the operation, when the last remaining attackers held out in the Taj Mahal hotel for several days. The operational goal of the attack clearly was to cause as many casualties as possible, particularly among Jews and well-to-do guests of five-star hotels. But attacks on various other targets, from railroad stations to hospitals, indicate that the more general purpose was to spread terror in a major Indian city.
While it is not clear precisely who carried out the Mumbai attack, two separate units apparently were involved. One group, possibly consisting of Indian Muslims, was established in Mumbai ahead of the attacks. The second group appears to have just arrived. It traveled via ship from Karachi, Pakistan, later hijacked a small Indian vessel to get past Indian coastal patrols, and ultimately landed near Mumbai.
Extensive preparations apparently had been made, including surveillance of the targets. So while the precise number of attackers remains unclear, the attack clearly was well-planned and well-executed.
Evidence and logic suggest that radical Pakistani Islamists carried out the attack. These groups have a highly complex and deliberately amorphous structure. Rather than being centrally controlled, ad hoc teams are created with links to one or more groups. Conceivably, they might have lacked links to any group, but this is hard to believe. Too much planning and training were involved in this attack for it to have been conceived by a bunch of guys in a garage. While precisely which radical Pakistani Islamist group or groups were involved is unknown,
the Mumbai attack appears to have originated in Pakistan. It could have been linked to al Qaeda prime or its various franchises and/or to Kashmiri insurgents.
More important than the question of the exact group that carried out the attack, however, is the attackers’ strategic end. There is a tendency to regard terror attacks as ends in themselves, carried out simply for the sake of spreading terror. In the highly politicized atmosphere of Pakistan’s radical Islamist factions, however, terror frequently has a more sophisticated and strategic purpose. Whoever invested the time and took the risk in organizing this attack had a reason to do so. Let’s work backward to that reason by examining the logical outcomes following this attack.
An End to New Delhi’s Restraint
The most striking aspect of the Mumbai attack is the challenge it presents to the Indian government — a challenge almost impossible for New Delhi to ignore. A December 2001 Islamist attack on the Indian parliament triggered an intense confrontation between India and Pakistan. Since then, New Delhi has not responded in a dramatic fashion to numerous Islamist attacks against India that were traceable to Pakistan. The Mumbai attack, by contrast, aimed to force a response from New Delhi by being so grievous that any Indian government showing only a muted reaction to it would fall.

India’s restrained response to Islamist attacks (even those originating in Pakistan) in recent years has come about because New Delhi has understood that, for a host of reasons, Islamabad has been unable to control radical Pakistani Islamist groups. India did not want war with Pakistan; it felt it had more important issues to deal with. New Delhi therefore accepted Islamabad’s assurances that Pakistan would do its best to curb terror attacks, and after suitable posturing, allowed tensions originating from Islamist attacks to pass.
This time, however, the attackers struck in such a way that New Delhi couldn’t allow the incident to pass. As one might expect, public opinion in India is shifting from stunned to furious. India’s Congress party-led government is politically weak and nearing the end of its life span. It lacks the political power to ignore the attack, even if it were inclined to do so. If it ignored the attack, it would fall, and a more intensely nationalist government would take its place. It is therefore very difficult to imagine circumstances under which the Indians could respond to this attack in the same manner they have to recent Islamist attacks.
What the Indians actually will do is not clear. In 2001-2002, New Delhi responded to the attack on the Indian parliament by moving forces close to the Pakistani border and the Line of Control that separates Indian- and Pakistani-controlled Kashmir, engaging in artillery duels along the front, and bringing its nuclear forces to a high level of alert. The Pakistanis made a similar response. Whether India ever actually intended to attack Pakistan remains unclear, but either way, New Delhi created an intense crisis in Pakistan.
The U.S. and the Indo-Pakistani Crisis

The United States used this crisis for its own ends. Having just completed the first phase of its campaign in Afghanistan, Washington was intensely pressuring Pakistan’s then-Musharraf government to expand cooperation with the United States; purge its intelligence organization, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), of radical Islamists; and crack down on al Qaeda and the Taliban in the Afghan-Pakistani border region. Former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf had been reluctant to cooperate with Washington, as doing so inevitably would spark a massive domestic backlash against his government.
The crisis with India produced an opening for the United States. Eager to get India to stand down from the crisis, the Pakistanis looked to the Americans to mediate. And the price for U.S. mediation was increased cooperation from Pakistan with the United States. The Indians, not eager for war, backed down from the crisis after guarantees that Islamabad would impose stronger controls on Islamist groups in Kashmir.
In 2001-2002, the Indo-Pakistani crisis played into American hands. In 2008, the new Indo-Pakistani crisis might play differently. The United States recently has demanded increased Pakistani cooperation along the Afghan border. Meanwhile, President-elect Barack Obama has stated his intention to focus on Afghanistan and pressure the Pakistanis.
Therefore, one of Islamabad’s first responses to the new Indo-Pakistani crisis was to announce that if the Indians increased their forces along Pakistan’s eastern border, Pakistan would be forced to withdraw 100,000 troops from its western border with Afghanistan. In other words, threats from India would cause Pakistan to dramatically reduce its cooperation with the United States in the Afghan war. The Indian foreign minister is flying to the United States to meet with Obama; obviously, this matter will be discussed among others.

We expect the United States to pressure India not to create a crisis, in order to avoid this outcome. As we have said, the problem is that it is unclear whether politically the Indians can afford restraint. At the very least, New Delhi must demand that the Pakistani government take steps to make the ISI and Pakistan’s other internal security apparatus more effective. Even if the Indians concede that there was no ISI involvement in the attack, they will argue that the ISI is incapable of stopping such attacks. They will demand a purge and reform of the ISI as a sign of Pakistani commitment. Barring that, New Delhi will move troops to the Indo-Pakistani frontier to intimidate Pakistan and placate Indian public opinion.
Dilemmas for Islamabad, New Delhi and Washington
At that point, Islamabad will have a serious problem. The Pakistani government is even weaker than the Indian government. Pakistan’s civilian regime does not control the Pakistani military, and therefore does not control the ISI. The civilians can’t decide to transform Pakistani security, and the military is not inclined to make this transformation. (Pakistan’s military has had ample opportunity to do so if it wished.)
Pakistan faces the challenge, just one among many, that its civilian and even military leadership lack the ability to reach deep into the ISI and security services to transform them. In some ways, these agencies operate under their own rules. Add to this the reality that the ISI and security forces — even if they are acting more assertively, as Islamabad claims — are demonstrably incapable of controlling radical Islamists in Pakistan. If they were capable, the attack on Mumbai would have been thwarted in Pakistan. The simple reality is that in Pakistan’s case, the will to make this transformation does not seem to be present, and even if it were, the ability to suppress terror attacks isn’t there.

The United States might well want to limit New Delhi’s response. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is on her way to India to discuss just this. But the politics of India’s situation make it unlikely that the Indians can do anything more than listen. It is more than simply a political issue for New Delhi; the Indians have no reason to believe that the Mumbai operation was one of a kind. Further operations like the Mumbai attack might well be planned. Unless the Pakistanis shift their posture inside Pakistan, India has no way of knowing whether other such attacks can be stymied. The Indians will be sympathetic to Washington’s plight in Afghanistan and the need to keep Pakistani troops at the Afghan border. But New Delhi will need something that the Americans — and in fact the Pakistanis — can’t deliver: a guarantee that there will be no more attacks like this one.
The Indian government cannot chance inaction. It probably would fall if it did. Moreover, in the event of inactivity and another attack, Indian public opinion probably will swing to an uncontrollable extreme. If an attack takes place but India has moved toward crisis posture with Pakistan, at least no one can argue that the Indian government remained passive in the face of threats to national security. Therefore, India is likely to refuse American requests for restraint.
It is possible that New Delhi will make a radical proposal to Rice, however. Given that the Pakistani government is incapable of exercising control in its own country, and given that Pakistan now represents a threat to both U.S. and Indian national security, the Indians might suggest a joint operation with the Americans against Pakistan.
What that joint operation might entail is uncertain, but regardless, this is something that Rice would reject out of hand and that Obama would reject in January 2009. Pakistan has a huge population and nuclear weapons, and the last thing Bush or Obama wants is to practice nation-building in Pakistan. The Indians, of course, will anticipate this response. The truth is that New Delhi itself does not want to engage deep in Pakistan to strike at militant training camps and other Islamist sites. That would be a nightmare. But if Rice shows up with a request for Indian restraint and no concrete proposal — or willingness to entertain a proposal — for solving the Pakistani problem, India will be able to refuse on the grounds that the Americans are asking India to absorb a risk (more Mumbai-style attacks) without the United States’ willingness to share in the risk.

Setting the Stage for a New Indo-Pakistani Confrontation
That will set the stage for another Indo-Pakistani confrontation. India will push forces forward all along the Indo-Pakistani frontier, move its nuclear forces to an alert level, begin shelling Pakistan, and perhaps — given the seriousness of the situation — attack short distances into Pakistan and even carry out airstrikes deep in Pakistan. India will demand greater transparency for New Delhi in Pakistani intelligence operations. The Indians will not want to occupy Pakistan; they will want to occupy Pakistan’s security apparatus.
Naturally, the Pakistanis will refuse that. There is no way they can give India, their main adversary, insight into Pakistani intelligence operations. But without that access, India has no reason to trust Pakistan. This will leave the Indians in an odd position: They will be in a near-war posture, but will have made no demands of Pakistan that Islamabad can reasonably deliver and that would benefit India. In one sense, India will be gesturing. In another sense, India will be trapped by making a gesture on which Pakistan cannot deliver. The situation thus could get out of hand.
In the meantime, the Pakistanis certainly will withdraw forces from western Pakistan and deploy them in eastern Pakistan. That will mean that one leg of the Petraeus and Obama plans would collapse. Washington’s expectation of greater Pakistani cooperation along the Afghan border will disappear along with the troops. This will free the Taliban from whatever limits the Pakistani army had placed on it. The Taliban’s ability to fight would increase, while the motivation for any of the Taliban to enter talks — as Afghan President Hamid Karzai has suggested — would decline. U.S. forces, already stretched to the limit, would face an increasingly difficult situation, while pressure on al Qaeda in the tribal areas would decrease.

Now, step back and consider the situation the Mumbai attackers have created. First, the Indian government faces an internal political crisis driving it toward a confrontation it didn’t plan on. Second, the minimum Pakistani response to a renewed Indo-Pakistani crisis will be withdrawing forces from western Pakistan, thereby strengthening the Taliban and securing al Qaeda. Third, sufficient pressure on Pakistan’s civilian government could cause it to collapse, opening the door to a military-Islamist government — or it could see Pakistan collapse into chaos, giving Islamists security in various regions and an opportunity to reshape Pakistan. Finally, the United States’ situation in Afghanistan has now become enormously more complex.
By staging an attack the Indian government can’t ignore, the Mumbai attackers have set in motion an existential crisis for Pakistan. The reality of Pakistan cannot be transformed, trapped as the country is between the United States and India. Almost every evolution from this point forward benefits Islamists. Strategically, the attack on Mumbai was a precise blow struck to achieve uncertain but favorable political outcomes for the Islamists.
Rice’s trip to India now becomes the crucial next step. She wants Indian restraint. She does not want the western Pakistani border to collapse. But she cannot guarantee what India must have: assurance of no further terror attacks on India originating in Pakistan. Without that, India must do something. No Indian government could survive without some kind of action. So it is up to Rice, in one of her last acts as secretary of state, to come up with a miraculous solution to head off a final, catastrophic crisis for the Bush administration — and a defining first crisis for the new Obama administration. Former U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld once said that the enemy gets a vote. The Islamists cast their ballot in Mumbai.