Thursday

I for Insanity - I for Ignorance - I for Islam

"What kind of a god is it that's upset by a cartoon in Danish?"
Salman Rushdie

Prologue: The Muslim Fury and its Impotence

From the ghettos of Bombay to the alleys of Beirut, from the tall minarets of Chittagong to the imposing domes of Birmingham, Islam is scaring the world like a terrifying dinosaur — its fiery tongue lashing out, its eyes red with tears of victimhood, its mind ravaged with the visions of the glories of the past, its whole body seething with rage at its wretched defeated present.

Islam is furious and the entire world is being seared by the flames of its outrage.

Why is Islam Angry?

Mussalmaans have one book. Koran. They should have another, too, detailing all the new legends, stories, and facts which have come to lay siege to the barren landscape of their closed minds.

The brutal stories are too many: Heads still hung down in mourning over the fall of Andalusia. Fists are frustratingly tightened over the unsuccessful Turkish sieges of Vienna. The decadence and fall of the Ottomans hurt like a rotten tooth.

Then there are shameful episodes of the near centuries: The fabled Mughal Empire of Hindustan compressed to present-day pathetic bubbles of Pakistan and Bangladesh, Jerusalem lost, Palestinians dumped, fellow Muslims massacred in periodic Indian riots, myths of Muslim blood coloring the Kashmiri and Chechnya mountainsides red, ungodly Amreekans camping over the holy sands of Mecca-Medina...

The Way They Were

Islam is a religion that once shined in innovation and dazzled the world with its scientific inventions and mathematical discoveries. Remember, algebra derived its name from the Arabic al-jabr, meaning 'the reunion of broken parts'. The great Muslim astronomer Nasir ad-Din at-Tusi wrote the Book of the Transversal Figure, which was the first treatment of plane and spherical trigonometry as independent mathematical sciences.

Edward Gibbons in his fifth volume of The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire had written that the science of chemistry owes its origin and improvements to the Muslims. The legendary Al Azhar University was founded in Cairo in 970 AD, making it older than Oxford — the oldest institution of higher learning in the English-speaking world.

Islam as a Beggar King

Today Islam resembles the last Mughal emperor of India - Bahadur Shah Zafar - whose writ was not obeyed even with the walls of his own palace in Delhi. He was thin, old, and dying. His skeleton figure, wrapped in unwashed, smelly, but royal kaftans and gowns, was exiled to Rangoon by the British in a buffalo cart!

This is what Islam has evolved itself into - the memories of the golden grandeur of the Past haunting the shameful poverty of the Present. The Muslims know it. They are grieving. They are hurt. They are ashamed.

They blame everybody but themselves for their state.

The Intellectual Retardation of Muhammad's Children

Islam has plummeted to depths of ignorance and backwardness. The first word revealed to Muhamamd was 'read'. Today they just read Koran. There are no great universities any longer in the world of Muslims. There are no invigorating publishing houses. There are no great authors coming from a religion which literally worships a book.

Incidentally, there are no good book shops in Pakistan, Bahrain or Saudia!

The few Islamic countries which are rich owe their wealth to the drilling of oil holes, not because of their people. The despots and kings of those lands waste their easy money in building more palaces and acquiring more jet planes. In the true traditions of the nouveau riche who lapped up fortunes by winning a lottery rather than doing hard work, the money is spent insensibly in a seriously flamboyant fashion.

This oil wealth, apart from being burned in pursuing private pleasures, is generously used to fund uneducated village mullahs to churn out atrocious fatwas, to build ugly tiled minarets in South Asia, to arm mad frenzied minds with bombs and missiles, to supply Korans, more Korans, more and more Korans for children to mug them up in the grimy madrasas of Xingjiang, Abuja, and Bukhara.

The early brilliance of Islam is gone and forgotten. What is left resembles a dog's two-day-old rotting corpse that stinks up an entire neighborhood.

The Complete Muslim Dictionary - Fatwas, Kafirs, and Jehads

The apologists plead that these Koranic terms have been hijacked by people who have no religion. They reason that Jihad does not mean killing people but actually it is all about struggling against evil inside oneself. It is about trying to become a better person.

The endnote being that terrorism has no religion.

No. Terrorism has a religion. People are killed, raped, and burned alive because they belong to this religion or that. The verses, quotes, stories, and legends are selectively lifted by modern day prophets to justify the killings of the people belonging to a different religion.

This is a crisis faced by every religion in the world but Islam, thanks to a surplus of weapons and combustible substances that are amply stockpiled and easily accessible in the regions where it dominates, the murderous frenzy of this faith has become the most damaging and visible.

Islam — A No-Tolerance Zone

The non-Islamic world sees Islam as a group of followers with no tolerance.

They ask why the problem areas of the world chiefly consist of Muslim-populated regions. They ask why Muslims could not live in harmony alongside people not following their faith.

Why did Salman Rushdie have a death fatwa issued against him? Why couldn't he freely roam the streets of Bombay - a city he loves and which has formed the backdrop of almost all his novels?

Why was there such intense fury against the Danish cartoons of Muhammad? Why does Allah seem so angry and his followers so violent?

The Rigidity and Hypocrisy

Do the Islamic societies exploit the free democracies of the rest of the world?

The Muslims happily leave their undemocratic, oil-rich, or oil-poor lands, to pursue happiness and wealth in free liberal countries. They make money, get educated, and are also free to recite Koran and perform five prayers a day. They have their own Friday mosques in their own neighborhoods in these foreign cities.

But their dictators and Imams do not allow the same benefits to non-Muslims in their own societies. There are no churches in Saudia. A non-Muslim cannot visit and attempt to understand the pull and magic of Allah in the al-Haram mosque of Mecca.

Saudia can send missionaries to India, fund Islamic societies there, but Hindus or Sikhs or Christians or Buddhists or Jains or Jews or Parsees in India cannot receive permission to propagate their respective faiths in Medina.

Islam appears to be a religion that has no qualms about using and exploiting other societies but remains reluctant to let it be equally open to outside influences.


Epilogue: Crib Crib Blame Blame

George Bush, Tony Blair, Commie China, Hindoo India
Red Sea, Ariel Sharon, Bloody Serbia

Hezbollah, Hamas, Mujahideen, Jehad
Kashmir, Chechenya, Abu Gharib

Al Sauds, H Bomb, bin Laden, Taliban
Bamiyan, The Koran and I, and The Satanic Verses

Allah, Medina, Muslims get a new Ummah
Hindus, Jews, Christians goodbye

We didn't start the fire
It was always burning
Since the world's been turning
We didn't start the fire

THE END

An India where gods inspire love and not hatred

An interview of a muslim lady taken by mayank in delhi in 2006.....



Conversations With A Muslim Lady from Delhi
[Mrs Falak Khan is a young wife with two children. She lives in Gaffar Manzil, Jamia Milia Islamia - a Muslim-populated locality of New Delhi. The interview was done in Hindi.]

Falak, what is the meaning of your name?

Aasmaan. Sky. It is an Arabic word.

You are an Indian Muslim woman. Do you feel victimized in this country?
No.

Don't you think that there are occasions when you are discriminated because of your name ... because of your religion?

Never. My daughter, Aital, is in the IVth standard. She was earlier studying at Summerfield School. I wanted her admission at KR Mangalam World School which is one of Delhi's best. Aital was a topper. She was instantly admitted to Mangalam. I know this happened because she was very good in her studies. We did not resort to any bribe. We did not depend on any sifarish [recommendation] by any influential person. Aital is a Muslim and there was no trouble.

So, you feel Muslims are not discriminated, after all?

Mayank, in India, if you are good, nobody can stop you. Isn't filmstar Shahrukh Khan a Muslim? What about (India's former cricket captain) Azharuddin? He is also a Muslim.

Then why are Muslims so backward? Why are they so uneducated?

It is because they don't study much. Schools are there but they don't send their children there. They are also very poor. They are tempted to put their children into work for extra income. Since parents are not educated themselves, they do not realize that a good education could change the lives of their children.

Falak, tell me about yourself. About your family, your husband, your childhood, your education.

(Smiles) ...From where to start? Ok. I'm from Kaimganj. It is a small town in North India. Papamian, my father, is a landlord there. Our great-grand father's grand father had come from Afghanistan and had settled there.

You are from Afghanistan? That is very exotic!

I'm from India. So I was saying that there are about two dozen Pathan families in Kaimganj. India's former President Zakir Hussain too hailed from Kaimganj. We are the two most renowned families there. We are distantly related, too.

Where did you do your education from?

I did my schooling in Kaimganj itself - in a all girls' school there. Later, I completed graduation in Political Science and Sociology from Aligarh Muslim University.

Being a young Muslim girl, do you think you had to face restrictions? How did your father let you live in Aligarh? Away from home?

There was no problem. Papamian wanted all of us four brothers and sisters to have good education. And then I lived in a girl's hostel in Aligarh. But now when I remember, there indeed were restrictions for being a Muslim girl. There were fifty advices of what-to-do and not-to-do once in Aligarh. And we were not allowed to visit the homes of our girl friends there. Dupatta (a scarf or covering for the head and upper body worn by women) was very important. We just could not go out without a dupatta. Our lives revolved around it. However inside the hostel, we were relatively free. We could even wear jeans!

Your description sounds so normal. It could be the life of any Indian girl. The general impression among the non-Muslims is that Muslim girls live behind black burqas and that their life is very tough. Perhaps you are an exception.

Well, I don't know. But yes, there are problems. Sometimes our religion comes in between. It restricts us. Sometimes there is confusion because of this. We get scared if we could be doing anything wrong. That it might be at variance with our religion. My younger sister wanted to be a dancer. She even wanted to become an actress. But Papamian did not allow it.

What about purdah?

It is a religious thing. But we are not forced to wear purdah. My husband has no problems. I go to gym, exercise on treadmill at home, and go for evening walks. It's fine. But when we go to Kaimganj, there things are different. If we go out there, we have to wear a chaddor. However now customs are relaxing. You know what Mayank: In Kaimganj, we do not feel comfortable outside without a chaddor...

Was yours an arranged marriage?

Yes, of course. (Laughs)

But were you consulted?

Yes if I would not have liked Avsaar Mian, my parents would had dropped the idea and looked elsewhere. But I liked him. He is very nice. I can shout at him for ever and ever but he has never raised his voice at me. Inshaallah.

Your life may be different, perhaps because you come from a wealthy family. But what about the general condition of Muslim women? Do you know a recent survey has revealed that only one in 101 Muslim women in India is a graduate?

Is it so? Very bad. But Islam doesn't stop women from doing all sorts of things. Take that famous bar dancer from Bombay - Tarannum. And then there is Tennis star Sania Mirza. And take me - a house wife. We all are Muslims. Only your religion can not define the life you chose for yourself.

What do you feel when you hear about the bomb blasts? It is believed that the Bombay blasts were carried out by Muslims. Do you think they could be justified?

I feel very bad. When I see all those dead bodies on TV ... Mayank, how can you distinguish a Muslim or a Hindu from those dead bodies? I feel terrible. That somebody somewhere must be waiting for those dead people ... it is horrible.

I still remember Rupin Katyal. You know him? He was a honeymooner who was killed during the plane hijacking by Muslim terrorists. I cried when he was shot dead by the hijackers. I know if I would have been in that plane, I would have prayed, pleaded, and impressed those terrorists with my knowledge of Koranic verses and would have bought the plane back with all the passengers alive and safe. My heart still bleeds for that poor man, and his parents and widow.

When terrorist events take place, what is your first feeling? Do you think that 'oh now we Muslims will again be blamed', or something on those lines?

I just feel sick. Kasam Khuda ki. (I swear on Allah) My only plea to terrorists is to please stop all this. We are scared. I'm afraid even while going to cinema theatres. What if something happens to my children? How could a bomb planted by Islamic terrorists know that my son is a Muslim?

[After a pause]

Evertime a blast happens, accusations are pointed towards Pakistan-based terrorists, and then it is the turn of us Muslims. Why are we accused for their actions? It is so insulting. I feel so humiliated.

Hundreds of Muslims were killed in the Gujarat riots of 2002. Some people say that terror attacks like what happened in July 2006 in Bombay were a reaction to it. Muslims were not getting justice. So they were humiliated and they took revenge by killing Hindus.

Mayank, tell me how could you imagine that I might get any satisfaction by watching the dead bodies of Hindus on my TV?

My son's best friend is a Hindu. His name is Ankush. He makes our life terrible by calling Arbaaz at all the odd hours and talking non-stop for hours and hours. Can I derive satisfaction if Ankush is killed in a bomb blast?

How could I be happy by the killing of Hindus? What sort of a question is this? My best friend till the Vth standard was a Hindu. Her name was Anita. I still remember her. We were very close friends. I even used to get her clothes stitched from our family tailor. How can I hate Hindus? You are a Hindu yourself, Mayank. Why will I talk to you if I dislike them? How can I get pleasure by Anita's husband being killed by terrorists?

[Here we are joined by Khaleda Begum, Falak's mother, who is visiting from Kaimganj]

Falak: Mayank, here is Ammi (mother). You must talk to her. Her youth was very different.

In what way? Were you discriminated? Were the rules harsher in your time?

Falak: Mayank, she was very beautiful when young. A real diamond!

[Khaleda Begum laughs]

Khaleda Begum: Son, if my parents were not my own mother and father, I would have gone on cursing them till the end of my life. They did not let me study. All I wanted was education. But even to mention the word 'school' in front of our father was sin.

Oh, tell me about your life. How were you raised?

Khaleda Begum: It was very bad. We were locked inside purdah. We could not go out. We had to stay home all the time. Even if we had to go to meet relations, which was rare, we had to go in a tonga that had a purdah draped all around it. It was terrible. All we did was stay at home and talk about wedding proposals.

Did you see your husband before marriage?

Khaleda Begum: No. We were not allowed to.

Oh, that's sad.

Khaleda Begum: But he was a distant relative so I knew about him. It was not bad. I'm very lucky.

Tell me more. What did your parents think of Hindus? That Hindus are bad people? One must not sit with them? One must not mingle much with them? That they were Kafirs?

Khaleda Begum: Rubbish. Nothing like that. I never heard any bad thing being said about Hindus. My maika [mother's home] is in Lalpur. We used to live, and still live, surrounded by Hindus. We have some close relations with some of the Hindu families there.

And what is this about not sitting with Hindus, Mayank son. Aren't I sitting with you? My sister-in-law is a Hindu. Many years back I had certain silly notions about Hindus. But when (sister-in-law) Rekha came and when she started drinking water from my glass, I gave no second thoughts of using her used glass, too. Where's the difference?

Khaledaji and Falak, what do you think about the present environment? Isn't it has grown ugly? Isn't there a deep divide between Hindus and Muslims, now?

Khaleda Begum: It is all because of the politicians. They all are bad.

[After a pause]

Falak: Mayank, the problem with Hindus is they do not think deep. They think every bearded man with a skull cap is a terrorist. They do not understand that these are merely the symbols of our religion. Do you look upon every turbaned Sikh as Khalistani supporter?

No.

Falak: Then why is it with our case? Hindus just do not know anything about us. Mayank, I know everything about Hindu rituals. I'm familiar with every little ceremony in their marriages. But I'm sure that if you query Hindu women about rituals in Nikah (Muslim wedding), they would be tongue tied.

Khaleda Begum: I really like some of their festivals, like Raksha Bandhan (a Hindu festival for borthers and sisters). It has nothing to do with Hindus or Muslims. It is all about heart.
Falak: If only Hindus know more about us, they will change their opinions.

Khaleda Begum: But Mayank son, you must also write that I do not view people as Hindus or Muslims. If I'll see a Muslim child and a Hindu child falling off from a cliff, I will rush to save both of them. I won't go first only to the Muslim. I will save them together.

Why, every time I come to Delhi I take Arbaaz's and Aital's old clothes and give it to the Bhurbhuriyas [Rajasthani gypsy tribes] living in our Kaimganj farm since 5 years. They all are Hindus. So what!

Now a sensitive question: do you cheer for Pakistan, or know anybody who does so in India-Pak cricket matches?

[Both burst into laughter]
Khaleda Begum: Save us from such questions.

But really, what do you think of Pakistan?

Khaleda Begum: We are better in all the respects than Pakistan. There are so many restrictions and control on women there. India is a much better place. Allah be grateful for making me born in India.

Falak: I think their women are too much into makeup and hair-dye. Too modern.

Khaleda Begum: Falak, the place where you took me yesterday evening! Tell that to Mayank.
Falak: We had taken Ammi to Barista coffee shop. She was so shocked to see the girls there.

Khaleda Begum: They were wearing almost nothing. No clothes. No looks. And no clue about education!

But the world is changing. Your grand daughter will roam around in micro minis when she grows up.

Falak: Mayank, in Islam they say: Aurat wohi bakshi jayegi jo sharamgaho ko chhupakar rakhegi. [Loosely translated: Only those women will be rescued who will carefully hide their assets from public gaze.] We believe that those Muslim women who expose their bodies will burn in hell.

In that case I'm nervous for the afterlife of your grand children, Falak.
[We all burst out laughing]

Khaleda Begum: We Muslims say that during the time of resurrection, buildings will be so tall that just looking up will make your topi fall down from your head...

Falak: And each boy will be surrounded by four girls...

It sounds delicious...

[A pause]

Let me change the subject. I see you have a Honda City car parked in your yard. You seem to be very wealthy. Then why are you staying in this locality? Do not misunderstand me please, but when I was coming here I had to cover my nose. The drains are open. It is stinking outside. You can afford to live in a better place. Why here?

Falak: I understand your point. But after so many communal riots we are just too careful. We want to live amongst our co-religionists.

My husband is a builder. Many wealthy people returning from Dubai and Saudi Arabia come to him looking for houses. Their only condition is for a Muslim locality. They have money to buy apartments in posh areas but nobody feels safe any longer.

Falak, any last word you would like to say?

[Long pause]

Mayank, I'm proud of being an Indian. I think Indian Muslims are the best Muslims in the world. Have you ever heard of any terrorist from India being caught in Kashmir? We are the most forward people. Our president is a Muslim.

Please tell for my sake that I do not like Pakistan. Neither have I any desire to go there. I love the freedom here. I love my India.

Thanks for sharing your thoughts.

Pak Media Outraged with Indo-US conspiracy

Indignation with India’s alleged “belligerence” marks Pakistan’s English language press on Wednesday. Newspaper editorials reject the evidence
that the 26/11 terrorists came from Pakistan. Instead, they find India and US ganging up on Pakistan, which they say is the real “victim” of terror.

Dawn’s editorial titled “A go-ahead for India?” says US president-elect Obama is stoking India-Pakistan hostilities. “American presidents have worked for peace, especially after the two countries acquired nuclear status. However, last Monday, president-elect Barack Obama seemed to have ditched this time-honoured American policy. There are concerns (in Pakistan) that India has benefited from the war on terror and has managed to advance its national interests. Overreaction to New Delhi’s demands would mean disastrous consequences for the region.”

The theme finds resonance in the popular daily from Peshawar and Quetta, the Frontier Post. Its editorial says, “Their (India’s) perceivable intent to link up the Mumbai holocaust’s perpetrators to Pakistan and then to al-Qaida is clearly intended to cash in — diplomatically, politically and militarily — on the current American assertions that it is now not Iraq or Afghanistan but Pakistan which is turning into al-Qaida’s haven.”

The pointing finger swings to India. The editorial adds, “With its demarche served on Islamabad, New Delhi has ratcheted up tensions to a perilous pitch which, if it doesn’t pull back, could go out of hand and boil over into an eventuality...It (India) cannot expect Pakistan to pay up the price for its own security and intelligence apparatus’s collapse. Nor can Pakistan become the guinea pig of its political compulsions or electoral necessities. It indeed is with a pinch of salt that one can take even its evidence.”

Wednesday

CONSPIRACY THEORIES CIRCULATING IN PAK MEDIA

Pakistan media finds "a wicked axis" of NewDelhi, Washington and Tel Aviv ganging up against Islamabad. In this backdrop, protecting Pakistan from terrorists and securing the national border are the key issues on the media agenda.

The sense of paranoia is apparent in a Frontier Post editorial published on Tuesday. It says "what can you expect when a wicked axis of America's CIA, India's RAW and Israel's Mossad are so active in fuelling and fanning militancy in our tribal region? Why is it (government) keeping mum? It is because of the wickedness of this wicked axis, our military and our people have been pitched against each other."

In an opinion piece, the Post explains why crippling the ISI would be suicidal. "For last several years Indian Intelligence Agency RAW, Afghan intelligence, allegedly Israeli Mossad, and others are aiding and fuelling Balochistani separatists, causing trouble in Karachi, and turmoil in North West Frontier Province. Pakistani people resent this external interference. The vast majority of Pakistanis fully support the ISI and fully expect it to aggressively counter conspiracy of external powers, and treacherous acts," says the Peshawar-based newspaper.

The Tuesday editorial of The Nation, Lahore, points out contradictionsin statements of US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Senator John McCain, to conclude that "the Americans must stop playing the devil's advocate and compel New Delhi to furnish concrete evidence to Islamabad of involvement in the Mumbai tragedy from the Pakistani side. India needs to be delivered a stern warning against creating war hysteria and at the same time also threatening Pakistan's security by spreading its intelligence networks in Afghanistan."

In this atmosphere of mistrust, Irfan Husain comes across as a voice of reason. In his column published in The Dawn, Husain wonders whether Pakistan is really a responsible state. "Indeed, a responsible state would hardly allow the likes of Maulana Masood Azhar of the Jaish-i-Mohammad; Hafiz Saeed of the Lashkar-i-Taiba; and the Indian criminal Dawood Ibrahim to run around loose. Every time the West raises a hue and cry following a particularly vicious terrorist attack, a few militant leaders and their followers are picked up, only to be released once the furore has died down. This sends a clear signal to the security agencies that these terrorists are above the law. So why should they risk their lives arresting them, only to see them being released a few weeks later?," he writes.

A straight-speak Dawn editorial titled The Terrorism Riddle is sharply critical of the US role in fuelling terrorism in Pakistan. "Indian and American officials suggest that a Pakistani connection to the Mumbai attacks has been irrefutably established, at least in the eyes of the wider world. (There is an) unspoken line of allegation against Pakistan: that we are a state with weak governance where terrorist groups have long run amok. We wish the world, and in particular the US, was not so selective in its memories of what has brought Pakistan to such a pass," says the editorial.

"If Lashkar-e-Taiba has grown to a position of such strength, it has not done so in a vacuum. The Lashkar's capabilities grew on the watch of Gen Musharraf supported by American dollars. Militancy is a problem in the region not only because of Pakistan's numerous sins of commission but also because of the sins of the US. Making the region a safe place is no easy task now."

The Karachi-based daily, The News, reports the resurrection of Pakistan's Defence Committee of the Cabinet by Prime Minister Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani. The defence committee was dormant for some time but was revived on Monday. National security was the main issue of discussion.

Interestingly, the News reports that Indian external affairs minister Pranab Mukherjee did call President Zardari. "The government has unimpeachable evidence about the phone call made by the Indian minister for external affairs Pranab Mukherjee to President Asif Ali Zardari and such proofs would be provided to the relevant people but the government would not allow it to become yet another controversy."

THE MAKING OF A TERRORIST

After the terror strike in Mumbai on November 26, the continuation of the probe and identification of the culprits depends on the evidence.Does India have evidence that the men who attacked Mumbai came from Pakistan? That they were recruited and trained and sent by Pakistan-based groups? Even now, ten days after the attack, the war over the evidence continues to escalate. Even today when the headlines were dominated by Pakistan's supposed promise that they would act against the Lashkar-e-Taiba. Pakistan clarified that they have made no such promise and once again asked India to come up with evidence to back its claims. At the centre of India's evidence is Mohammed Ajmal Amir, the terrorist who is in India's custody. It is his story, which nails any doubts about where these men came from. Here is the full definitive account of the making of Mohammad Ajmal Amir Qasab in his own words.

Qasab: The coordinates
Name: Mohammed Ajmal Amir Qasab
Father: Mohammed Amir Imam Qasab
Occupation: Dahi Puri stall
Mother: Noor-e-Tai
Address: Village Faridkot, Dipalpur Tehsil, Okara district
Uncles: Nazir residing at Chamiayya Chisti, Lakhirpur Road and Manzoor residing at Safawala Chowk, Lahore

Qasab: The early years
Qasab said that he studied till class 4 at a government primary school and went to Lahore in 2000 after leaving school. He then stayed with brother Afzal in galli number 54, room number 12, mohalla, Toit Abad, near Yadgar Minar, Lahore.He said he did labour jobs at different places till 2005. In 2005, he had quarrel with my father and left home. He said, he went to Ali Hajveri Darbar at Lahore, for a home for runaway boys.From robbery to terrorismIt's at this home for runaway boys that the turning point came. Qasab met a man called Shafiq with whom he worked it seemed in a restaurant. Shafiq introduced him to a man Muzaffar with whom he would enter a life of petty criminality the first step towards becoming a terrorist.Qasab said that he came in contact with Muzaffar Lal Khan, resident of Romiya Village, Atak Tehsil. He then decided to enter into dacoity to make more money. He hired a flat at Bangash Colony, Rawalpindi. Qasab told they needed firerarms for the job and in search of firearms, we saw some LeT stalls at Raja Bazaar, Rawalpindi. We decided to join the LeT for weapons training. Mohammed Ajmal Amir Qasab identified in Faridkot? An article in newspaper Observer has reported that electoral lists for Faridkot shows a Mohammed Amir and that his national identity card number obtained. A villager is quoted saying that we know that boy (caught in Mumbai) is from Faridkot and they knew him from the first night (of the attack). "They brainwash our youth about jihad, there are people who do it in this village. It is so wrong," the villager told the Observer. "Faridkot is active recruiting ground for LeT. Qasab has not lived in Faridkot for four years; visited family once a year. Qasab frequently talked of freeing Kashmir from Indian rule," he added.

Qasab: Training to be LeT
Qasab had three rounds of training to be a Let militant.

Round 1 Qasab told the investigators that they were given Rs 200 and asked to go to Marqas Taiyyaba, Muridke. The first round of training called Daura-Sufa went on for 21 days. There were lectures on Hadis, Quran by Mufti Sayeed. The routine during the round was -- rest, lunch, namaz, PT, games, namaz and dinner.

Round 2 The second round was called Daura-aam or which also took 21 days. It was held at Mansehra, Buttal village. The weapons training was given by Abdul Rehman. The weapons mainly were AK-47, Green-O, SKS, Uzi guns, pistol, revolver. The routine included rest, lunch, namaz, PT, games, namaz and dinner.He said that they took a break to do Khidmat or service for two months.

Round 3 The third round of training, called Daura-Khas, went on for three months. It was held at Chelabandi Pahadi area. The Weapons instructor this time was Abu Mawiya and they were trained to operate weapons such as hand grenades, rocker launcher and mortar. The lectures were given on Indian security agencies.Countdown to the missionQasab said that out of 32 trainees, 16 were selected for confidential operation by Zaqi-ur-Rehman, who was also called chacha. Out of 16 selected, three ran away. "Thirteen trainees were then sent for two rounds of training to Muridke camp. We were taught swimming, shown clippings of atrocities on Muslims in India and took lectures on RAW," he said.

Mission Mumbai
The final ten
Date: September 15, 2008
Qasab and Ismail: Team CST-- Abu Aksha and Abu Umar, Bada Abdul Rehman and Abu Ali, Chotta Abdul Rehman and Afadulla, and Shoaib and Abu UmerQasab said they were shown film on CST station and were told to kidnap people and take them on a roof of the building. He said we then had to contact Abdul Rahman, who would give numbers of TV channels and we were to contact them on phone and make demands for releasing hostages."We were to move on September 27, but it got cancelled. We stayed at Karachi and practised travelling by speed boats. We finally moved on November 23," he said.

The Kuber inventory: Traces of evidence?
The empty packets of 50 rounds of bullets for .34 bore gun. Made in China.
Pink foam wrapping weapon.
Nylon rope used to transfer goods from mother ship to vessel.
Yellow bag made of nylon strings tied together, which had blood-like stains on the inside.
16 multi-coloured blankets.
A namaaz kerchief in black and white with the label "Cashmilan Best Qlty, Phone 061 4516729."
Black quarter pants with the label South Pole, Made in Pakistan.
Four boxes of detergent with the label Pakistan.
Two sachets of Nestle Milk Pak, Nestle Pakistan Limited.
Two black leather belts.
Eight pencil cell batteries from Duracell.
Eight razors of the brand Gelite.
Shaving cream, brand Touchme, Made in Pakistan.
Dental cream, brand Medicam, Made in Pakistan.
Tissue paper, brand Zik Brothers, Karachi.
55 litre plastic tank made in the Gulf. The address on it: HO No 8, Industrial area Karachi, Pakistan. Contact Number: 042577488-9, 0425770811.

Monday

Next Steps in the Indo-Pakistani Crisis

Three Indian Views of Pakistan

The question is what an Indian strike against Pakistan, beyond placating domestic public opinion, would achieve. There are three views on this in India.

The first view holds that Pakistani officials aid and abet terrorism — in particular the Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), which serves as Pakistan’s main intelligence service. In this view, the terrorist attacks are the work of Pakistani government officials — perhaps not all of the government, but enough officials of sufficient power that the rest of the government cannot block them, and therefore the entire Pakistani government can be held accountable.

The second view holds that terrorist attacks are being carried out by Kashmiri groups that have long been fostered by the ISI but have grown increasingly autonomous since 2002 — and that the Pakistani government has deliberately failed to suppress anti-Indian operations by these groups. In this view, the ISI and related groups are either aware of these activities or willfully ignorant of them, even if ISI is not in direct control. Under this thinking, the ISI and the Pakistanis are responsible by omission, if not by commission.

The third view holds that the Pakistani government is so fragmented and weak that it has essentially lost control of Pakistan to the extent that it cannot suppress these anti-Indian groups. This view says that the army has lost control of the situation to the point where many from within the military-intelligence establishment are running rogue operations, and groups in various parts of the country simply do what they want. If this argument is pushed to its logical conclusion, Pakistan should be regarded as a state on the verge of failure, and an attack by India might precipitate further weakening, freeing radical Islamist groups from what little control there is.

The first two analyses are essentially the same. They posit that Pakistan could stop attacks on India, but chooses not to. The third is the tricky one. It rests on the premise that the Pakistani government (and in this we include the Pakistani army) is placing some restraint on the attackers. Thus, the government’s collapse would make enough difference that India should restrain itself, especially as any Indian attack would so destabilize Pakistan that it would unleash our scenario and worse. In this view, Pakistan’s civilian government has only as much power in these matters as the army is willing to allow.

The argument against attacking Pakistan therefore rests on a very thin layer of analysis. It requires the belief that Pakistan is not responsible for the attacks, that it is nonetheless restraining radical Islamists to some degree, and that an Indian attack would cause even these modest restraints to disappear. Further, it assumes that these restraints, while modest, are substantial enough to make a difference.

There is a debate in India, and in Washington, as to whether this is the case. This is why New Delhi has demanded that Pakistan turn over 20 individuals wanted by India in connection with attacks. The list doesn’t merely include Islamists, but also Lt. Gen. Hamid Gul, the former head of the ISI who has long been suspected of close ties with Islamists. (The United States apparently added Gul to the list.) Turning those individuals over would be enormously difficult politically for Pakistan. It would create a direct confrontation between Pakistan’s government and the Pakistani Islamist movement, likely sparking violence in Pakistan. Indeed, turning any Pakistani over to India, regardless of ideology, would create a massive crisis in Pakistan.

The Indian government chose to make this demand precisely because complying with it is enormously difficult for Pakistan. New Delhi is not so much demanding the 20 individuals, but rather that Pakistan take steps that will create conflict in Pakistan. If the Pakistani government is in control of the country, it should be able to weather the storm. If it can’t weather the storm, then the government is not in control of Pakistan. And if it could weather the storm but chooses not to incur the costs, then India can reasonably claim that Pakistan is prepared to export terrorism rather than endure it at home. In either event, the demand reveals things about the Pakistani reality.

The View from Islamabad

Pakistan’s evaluation, of course, is different. Islamabad does not regard itself as failed because it cannot control all radical Islamists or the Taliban. The official explanation is that the Pakistanis are doing the best they can. From the Pakistani point of view, while the Islamists ultimately might represent a threat, the threat to Pakistan and its government that would arise from a direct assault on the Islamists is a great danger not only to Pakistan, but also to the region. It is thus better for all to let the matter rest. The Islamist issue aside, Pakistan sees itself as continuing to govern the country effectively, albeit with substantial social and economic problems (as one might expect). The costs of confronting the Islamists, relative to the benefits, are therefore high.

The Pakistanis see themselves as having several effective counters against an Indian attack. The most important of these is the United States. The very first thing Islamabad said after the Mumbai attack was that a buildup of Indian forces along the Pakistani border would force Pakistan to withdraw 100,000 troops from its Afghan border. Events over the weekend, such as the attack on a NATO convoy, showed the vulnerability of NATO’s supply line across Pakistan to Afghanistan.

The Americans are fighting a difficult holding action against the Taliban in Afghanistan. The United States needs the militant base camps in Pakistan and the militants’ lines of supply cut off, but the Americans lack the force to do this themselves. A withdrawal of Pakistani forces from the Afghan border would pose a direct threat to American forces. Therefore, the Pakistanis expect Washington to intervene on their behalf to prevent an Indian attack. They do not believe a major Indian troop buildup will take place, and if it does, the Pakistanis do not think it will lead to substantial conflict.

There has been some talk of an Indian naval blockade against Pakistan, blocking the approaches to Pakistan’s main port of Karachi. This is an attractive strategy for India, as it plays to New Delhi’s relative naval strength. Again, the Pakistanis do not believe the Indians will do this, given that it would cut off the flow of supplies to American troops in Afghanistan. (Karachi is the main port serving U.S. forces in Afghanistan.) The line of supply in Afghanistan runs through Pakistan, and the Americans, the Pakistanis calculate, do not want anything to threaten that.

From the Pakistani point of view, the only potential military action India could take that would not meet U.S. opposition would be airstrikes. There has been talk that the Indians might launch airstrikes against Islamist training camps and bases in Pakistani-administered Kashmir. In Pakistan’s view, this is not a serious problem. Mounting airstrikes against training camps is harder than it might seem. The only way to achieve anything in such a facility is with area destruction weapons — for instance, using B-52s to drop ordnance over very large areas. The targets are not amenable to strike aircraft, because the payload of such aircraft is too small. It would be tough for the Indians, who don’t have strategic bombers, to hit very much. Numerous camps exist, and the Islamists can afford to lose some. As an attack, it would be more symbolic than effective.

Moreover, if the Indians did kill large numbers of radical Islamists, this would hardly pose a problem to the Pakistani government. It might even solve some of Islamabad’s problems, depending on which analysis you accept. Airstrikes would generate massive support among Pakistanis for their government so long as Islamabad remained defiant of India. Pakistan thus might even welcome Indian airstrikes against Islamist training camps.

Islamabad also views the crisis with India with an eye to the Pakistani nuclear arsenal. Any attack by India that might destabilize the Pakistani government opens at least the possibility of a Pakistani nuclear strike or, in the event of state disintegration, of Pakistani nuclear weapons falling into the hands of factional elements. If India presses too hard, New Delhi faces the unknown of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal — unless, of course, the Indians are preparing a pre-emptive nuclear attack on Pakistan, something the Pakistanis find unlikely.

All of this, of course, depends upon two unknowns. First, what is the current status of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal? Is it sufficiently reliable for Pakistan to count on? Second, to what extent do the Americans monitor Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities? Ever since the crisis of 2002, when American fears that Pakistani nuclear weapons could fall into al Qaeda’s hands were high, we have assumed that American calm about Pakistan’s nuclear facilities was based on Washington’s having achieved a level of transparency on their status. This might limit Pakistan’s freedom of action with regard to — and hence ability to rely on — its nuclear arsenal.

Notably, much of Pakistan’s analysis of the situation rests on a core assumption — namely, that the United States will choose to limit Indian options, and just as important, that the Indians would listen to Washington. India does not have the same relationship or dependence on the United States as, for example, Israel does. India historically was allied with the Soviet Union; New Delhi moved into a strategic relationship with the United States only in recent years. There is a commonality of interest between India and the United States, but not a dependency. India would not necessarily be blocked from action simply because the Americans didn’t want it to act.

As for the Americans, Pakistan’s assumption that the United States would want to limit India is unclear. Islamabad’s threat to shift 100,000 troops from the Afghan border will not easily be carried out. Pakistan’s logistical capabilities are limited. Moreover, the American objection to Pakistan’s position is that the vast majority of these troops are not engaged in controlling the border anyway, but are actually carefully staying out of the battle. Given that the Americans feel that the Pakistanis are ineffective in controlling the Afghan-Pakistani border, the shift from virtually to utterly ineffective might not constitute a serious deterioration from the United States’ point of view. Indeed, it might open the door for more aggressive operations on — and over — the Afghan-Pakistani border by American forces, perhaps by troops rapidly transferred from Iraq.

The situation of the port of Karachi is more serious, both in the ground and naval scenarios. The United States needs Karachi; it is not in a position to seize the port and the road system out of Karachi. That is a new war the United States can’t fight. At the same time, the United States has been shifting some of its logistical dependency from Pakistan to Central Asia. But this requires a degree of Russian support, which would cost Washington dearly and take time to activate. In short, India’s closing the port of Karachi by blockade, or Pakistan’s doing so as retaliation for Indian action, would hurt the United States badly.

Supply lines aside, Islamabad should not assume that the United States is eager to ensure that the Pakistani state survives. Pakistan also should not assume that the United States is impressed by the absence or presence of Pakistani troops on the Afghan border. Washington has developed severe doubts about Pakistan’s commitment and effectiveness in the Afghan-Pakistani border region, and therefore about Pakistan’s value as an ally.

Pakistan’s strongest card with the United States is the threat to block the port of Karachi. But here, too, there is a counter to Pakistan: If Pakistan closes Karachi to American shipping, either the Indian or American navy also could close it to Pakistani shipping. Karachi is Pakistan’s main export facility, and Pakistan is heavily dependent on it. If Karachi were blocked, particularly while Pakistan is undergoing a massive financial crisis, Pakistan would face disaster. Karachi is thus a double-edged sword. As long as Pakistan keeps it open to the Americans, India probably won’t block it. But should Pakistan ever close the port in response to U.S. action in the Afghan-Pakistani borderland, then Pakistan should not assume that the port will be available for its own use.

India’s Military Challenge

India faces difficulties in all of its military options. Attacks on training camps sound more effective than they are. Concentrating troops on the border is impressive only if India is prepared for a massive land war, and a naval blockade has multiple complications.

India needs a military option that demonstrates will and capability and decisively hurts the Pakistani government, all without drawing India into a nuclear exchange or costly ground war. And its response must rise above the symbolic.

I have no idea what India is thinking, but one obvious option is airstrikes directed not against training camps, but against key government installations in Islamabad. The Indian air force increasingly has been regarded as professional and capable by American pilots at Red Flag exercises in Nevada. India has modern Russian fighter jets and probably has the capability, with some losses, to penetrate deep into Pakistani territory.

India also has acquired radar and electronic warfare equipment from Israel and might have obtained some early precision-guided munitions from Russia and/or Israel. While this capability is nascent, untested and very limited, it is nonetheless likely to exist in some form.

The Indians might opt for a drawn-out diplomatic process under the theory that all military action is either ineffective or excessively risky. If it chooses the military route, New Delhi could opt for a buildup of ground troops and some limited artillery exchanges and tactical ground attacks. It also could choose airstrikes against training facilities. Each of these military options would achieve the goal of some substantial action, but none would threaten fundamental Pakistani interests. The naval blockade has complexities that could not be managed. That leaves, as a possible scenario, a significant escalation by India against targets in Pakistan’s capital.

The Indians have made it clear that the ISI is their enemy. The ISI has a building, and buildings can be destroyed, along with files and personnel. Such an aerial attack also would serve to shock the Pakistanis by representing a serious escalation. And Pakistan might find retaliation difficult, given the relative strength of its air force. India has few good choices for retaliation, and while this option is not a likely one, it is undoubtedly one that has to be considered.

It seems to us that India can avoid attacks on Pakistan only if Islamabad makes political concessions that it would find difficult to make. The cost to Pakistan of these concessions might well be greater than the benefit of avoiding conflict with India. All of India’s options are either ineffective or dangerous, but inactivity is politically and strategically the least satisfactory route for New Delhi. This circumstance is the most dangerous aspect of the current situation. In my opinion, the relative quiet at present should not be confused with the final outcome, unless Pakistan makes surprising concessions.

Tuesday

Strategic Motivations for the Mumbai Attack


Last Wednesday evening, a group of Islamist operatives carried out a
complex terror operation in the Indian city of Mumbai
. The attack was not complex because of the weapons used or its size, but in the apparent training, multiple methods of approaching the city and excellent operational security and discipline in the final phases of the operation, when the last remaining attackers held out in the Taj Mahal hotel for several days. The operational goal of the attack clearly was to cause as many casualties as possible, particularly among Jews and well-to-do guests of five-star hotels. But attacks on various other targets, from railroad stations to hospitals, indicate that the more general purpose was to spread terror in a major Indian city.
While it is not clear precisely who carried out the Mumbai attack, two separate units apparently were involved. One group, possibly consisting of Indian Muslims, was established in Mumbai ahead of the attacks. The second group appears to have just arrived. It traveled via ship from Karachi, Pakistan, later hijacked a small Indian vessel to get past Indian coastal patrols, and ultimately landed near Mumbai.
Extensive preparations apparently had been made, including surveillance of the targets. So while the precise number of attackers remains unclear, the attack clearly was well-planned and well-executed.
Evidence and logic suggest that radical Pakistani Islamists carried out the attack. These groups have a highly complex and deliberately amorphous structure. Rather than being centrally controlled, ad hoc teams are created with links to one or more groups. Conceivably, they might have lacked links to any group, but this is hard to believe. Too much planning and training were involved in this attack for it to have been conceived by a bunch of guys in a garage. While precisely which radical Pakistani Islamist group or groups were involved is unknown,
the Mumbai attack appears to have originated in Pakistan. It could have been linked to al Qaeda prime or its various franchises and/or to Kashmiri insurgents.
More important than the question of the exact group that carried out the attack, however, is the attackers’ strategic end. There is a tendency to regard terror attacks as ends in themselves, carried out simply for the sake of spreading terror. In the highly politicized atmosphere of Pakistan’s radical Islamist factions, however, terror frequently has a more sophisticated and strategic purpose. Whoever invested the time and took the risk in organizing this attack had a reason to do so. Let’s work backward to that reason by examining the logical outcomes following this attack.
An End to New Delhi’s Restraint
The most striking aspect of the Mumbai attack is the challenge it presents to the Indian government — a challenge almost impossible for New Delhi to ignore. A December 2001 Islamist attack on the Indian parliament triggered an intense confrontation between India and Pakistan. Since then, New Delhi has not responded in a dramatic fashion to numerous Islamist attacks against India that were traceable to Pakistan. The Mumbai attack, by contrast, aimed to force a response from New Delhi by being so grievous that any Indian government showing only a muted reaction to it would fall.

India’s restrained response to Islamist attacks
(even those originating in Pakistan) in recent years has come about because New Delhi has understood that, for a host of reasons, Islamabad has been unable to control radical Pakistani Islamist groups. India did not want war with Pakistan; it felt it had more important issues to deal with. New Delhi therefore accepted Islamabad’s assurances that Pakistan would do its best to curb terror attacks, and after suitable posturing, allowed tensions originating from Islamist attacks to pass.
This time, however, the attackers struck in such a way that New Delhi couldn’t allow the incident to pass. As one might expect, public opinion in India is shifting from stunned to furious. India’s Congress party-led government is politically weak and nearing the end of its life span. It lacks the political power to ignore the attack, even if it were inclined to do so. If it ignored the attack, it would fall, and a more intensely nationalist government would take its place. It is therefore very difficult to imagine circumstances under which the Indians could respond to this attack in the same manner they have to recent Islamist attacks.
What the Indians actually will do is not clear. In 2001-2002, New Delhi responded to the attack on the Indian parliament by moving forces close to the Pakistani border and the Line of Control that separates Indian- and Pakistani-controlled Kashmir, engaging in artillery duels along the front, and bringing its nuclear forces to a high level of alert. The Pakistanis made a similar response. Whether India ever actually intended to attack Pakistan remains unclear, but either way, New Delhi created an intense crisis in Pakistan.
The U.S. and the Indo-Pakistani Crisis

The United States used this crisis
for its own ends. Having just completed the first phase of its campaign in Afghanistan, Washington was intensely pressuring Pakistan’s then-Musharraf government to expand cooperation with the United States; purge its intelligence organization, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), of radical Islamists; and crack down on al Qaeda and the Taliban in the Afghan-Pakistani border region. Former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf had been reluctant to cooperate with Washington, as doing so inevitably would spark a massive domestic backlash against his government.
The crisis with India produced an opening for the United States. Eager to get India to stand down from the crisis, the Pakistanis looked to the Americans to mediate. And the price for U.S. mediation was increased cooperation from Pakistan with the United States. The Indians, not eager for war, backed down from the crisis after guarantees that Islamabad would impose stronger controls on Islamist groups in Kashmir.
In 2001-2002, the Indo-Pakistani crisis played into American hands. In 2008, the new Indo-Pakistani crisis might play differently. The United States recently has demanded increased Pakistani cooperation along the Afghan border. Meanwhile, President-elect Barack Obama has stated his intention to focus on Afghanistan and pressure the Pakistanis.
Therefore, one of Islamabad’s first responses to the new Indo-Pakistani crisis was to announce that if the Indians increased their forces along Pakistan’s eastern border, Pakistan would be forced to withdraw 100,000 troops from its western border with Afghanistan. In other words, threats from India would cause Pakistan to dramatically reduce its cooperation with the United States in the Afghan war. The Indian foreign minister is flying to the United States to meet with Obama; obviously, this matter will be discussed among others.

We expect the United States to pressure India not to create a crisis, in order to avoid this outcome. As we have said, the problem is that it is unclear whether politically the Indians can afford restraint. At the very least, New Delhi must demand that the Pakistani government take steps to make the ISI and Pakistan’s other internal security apparatus more effective. Even if the Indians concede that there was no ISI involvement in the attack, they will argue that the ISI is incapable of stopping such attacks. They will demand a purge and reform of the ISI as a sign of Pakistani commitment. Barring that, New Delhi will move troops to the Indo-Pakistani frontier to intimidate Pakistan and placate Indian public opinion.
Dilemmas for Islamabad, New Delhi and Washington
At that point, Islamabad will have a serious problem. The Pakistani government is even weaker than the Indian government. Pakistan’s civilian regime does not control the Pakistani military, and therefore does not control the ISI. The civilians can’t decide to transform Pakistani security, and the military is not inclined to make this transformation. (Pakistan’s military has had ample opportunity to do so if it wished.)
Pakistan faces the challenge, just one among many, that its civilian and even military leadership lack the ability to reach deep into the ISI and security services to transform them. In some ways, these agencies operate under their own rules. Add to this the reality that the ISI and security forces — even if they are acting more assertively, as Islamabad claims — are demonstrably incapable of controlling radical Islamists in Pakistan. If they were capable, the attack on Mumbai would have been thwarted in Pakistan. The simple reality is that in Pakistan’s case, the will to make this transformation does not seem to be present, and even if it were, the ability to suppress terror attacks isn’t there.

The United States might well want to limit New Delhi’s response. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is on her way to India to discuss just this. But the politics of India’s situation make it unlikely that the Indians can do anything more than listen. It is more than simply a political issue for New Delhi; the Indians have no reason to believe that the Mumbai operation was one of a kind. Further operations like the Mumbai attack might well be planned. Unless the Pakistanis shift their posture inside Pakistan, India has no way of knowing whether other such attacks can be stymied. The Indians will be sympathetic to Washington’s plight in Afghanistan and the need to keep Pakistani troops at the Afghan border. But New Delhi will need something that the Americans — and in fact the Pakistanis — can’t deliver: a guarantee that there will be no more attacks like this one.
The Indian government cannot chance inaction. It probably would fall if it did. Moreover, in the event of inactivity and another attack, Indian public opinion probably will swing to an uncontrollable extreme. If an attack takes place but India has moved toward crisis posture with Pakistan, at least no one can argue that the Indian government remained passive in the face of threats to national security. Therefore, India is likely to refuse American requests for restraint.
It is possible that New Delhi will make a radical proposal to Rice, however. Given that the Pakistani government is incapable of exercising control in its own country, and given that Pakistan now represents a threat to both U.S. and Indian national security, the Indians might suggest a joint operation with the Americans against Pakistan.
What that joint operation might entail is uncertain, but regardless, this is something that Rice would reject out of hand and that Obama would reject in January 2009. Pakistan has a huge population and nuclear weapons, and the last thing Bush or Obama wants is to practice nation-building in Pakistan. The Indians, of course, will anticipate this response. The truth is that New Delhi itself does not want to engage deep in Pakistan to strike at militant training camps and other Islamist sites. That would be a nightmare. But if Rice shows up with a request for Indian restraint and no concrete proposal — or willingness to entertain a proposal — for solving the Pakistani problem, India will be able to refuse on the grounds that the Americans are asking India to absorb a risk (more Mumbai-style attacks) without the United States’ willingness to share in the risk.

Setting the Stage for a New Indo-Pakistani Confrontation
That will set the stage for another Indo-Pakistani confrontation. India will push forces forward all along the Indo-Pakistani frontier, move its nuclear forces to an alert level, begin shelling Pakistan, and perhaps — given the seriousness of the situation — attack short distances into Pakistan and even carry out airstrikes deep in Pakistan. India will demand greater transparency for New Delhi in Pakistani intelligence operations. The Indians will not want to occupy Pakistan; they will want to occupy Pakistan’s security apparatus.
Naturally, the Pakistanis will refuse that. There is no way they can give India, their main adversary, insight into Pakistani intelligence operations. But without that access, India has no reason to trust Pakistan. This will leave the Indians in an odd position: They will be in a near-war posture, but will have made no demands of Pakistan that Islamabad can reasonably deliver and that would benefit India. In one sense, India will be gesturing. In another sense, India will be trapped by making a gesture on which Pakistan cannot deliver. The situation thus could get out of hand.
In the meantime, the Pakistanis certainly will withdraw forces from western Pakistan and deploy them in eastern Pakistan. That will mean that one leg of the Petraeus and Obama plans would collapse. Washington’s expectation of greater Pakistani cooperation along the Afghan border will disappear along with the troops. This will free the Taliban from whatever limits the Pakistani army had placed on it. The Taliban’s ability to fight would increase, while the motivation for any of the Taliban to enter talks — as Afghan President Hamid Karzai has suggested — would decline. U.S. forces, already stretched to the limit, would face an increasingly difficult situation, while pressure on al Qaeda in the tribal areas would decrease.

Now, step back and consider the situation the Mumbai attackers have created. First, the Indian government faces an internal political crisis driving it toward a confrontation it didn’t plan on. Second, the minimum Pakistani response to a renewed Indo-Pakistani crisis will be withdrawing forces from western Pakistan, thereby strengthening the Taliban and securing al Qaeda. Third, sufficient pressure on Pakistan’s civilian government could cause it to collapse, opening the door to a military-Islamist government — or it could see Pakistan collapse into chaos, giving Islamists security in various regions and an opportunity to reshape Pakistan. Finally, the United States’ situation in Afghanistan has now become enormously more complex.
By staging an attack the Indian government can’t ignore, the Mumbai attackers have set in motion an existential crisis for Pakistan. The reality of Pakistan cannot be transformed, trapped as the country is between the United States and India. Almost every evolution from this point forward benefits Islamists. Strategically, the attack on Mumbai was a precise blow struck to achieve uncertain but favorable political outcomes for the Islamists.
Rice’s trip to India now becomes the crucial next step. She wants Indian restraint. She does not want the western Pakistani border to collapse. But she cannot guarantee what India must have: assurance of no further terror attacks on India originating in Pakistan. Without that, India must do something. No Indian government could survive without some kind of action. So it is up to Rice, in one of her last acts as secretary of state, to come up with a miraculous solution to head off a final, catastrophic crisis for the Bush administration — and a defining first crisis for the new Obama administration. Former U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld once said that the enemy gets a vote. The Islamists cast their ballot in Mumbai.